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SYSTEMIC RACIAL BIAS AND RICO'S APPLICATION
TO CRIMINAL STREET AND PRISON GANGS
Jordan Blair Woods*
This Article presents an empirical study of race and the application of the frderal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to criminal street
and prison gangs. A strong majority (approximately 86%) of the prosecutions in
the study involved gangs that were affiliated with one or more racial minority
groups. All but one of the prosecuted White-affiliated gangs fell into three categories:
international organized crime groups, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and White
supremacist prison gangs. Some scholars and practitioners would explain these
findings by contending that most criminal street gangs are comprised of racial
minorities. This Article challenges and problematizes this factual assumption by
critically examining the processes by which the government may come to label certain
aiminal groups as gangs for RICO purposes. Based on the study findings, the
Article argues that this labeling may be driven by systemic racial biases that
marginalize entire racial minority groups and privilege mainstream nonimmigrant
White communities. These systemic biases are characterized by converging
constructions of race and crime, which fuse perceptions of gang-related crime with
images of racial minorities. Conflating racial minorities with criminal activity enables
the government to rely upon denigrating racial stereotypes in order to engage in
invidious practices of racial profiling and to conduct sweeping arrests of racial
minorities under RICO. This conflation also shields groups of nonimmigrant
White criminal offenders from being conceptualized as gangs and shields
nonimm~grant White neighborhoods from the stigma of having gang problems. In
practice, this may harm communities that have White gang problems by preventing
the government from executing gang-specific interventions within those communities.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)' to dismantle the Mafia and other bodies of
organized crime with great economic influence. 2 The U.S. government
expanded the scope of RICO to include gangs in the 1980s.' Since many
states do not have laws specifically designed to dismantle gangs,4 RICO
provides a federal avenue to target gangs within any jurisdiction of the
United States.'
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 55 1961-68 (2006)). A majority of states have also en-
acted RICO statutes, which cover a wide spectrum of civil and criminal activities. Some
states have used state RICO statutes to target criminal street and prison gangs. See, e.g.,
Erin Hoover, Oregon Uses Racketeering Law on Gangs, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 14, 1994, at
A01, available at NewsBank, Record No. 9411140217. For a discussion of the differences
between federal RICO and state RICO statutes, see JOHN E. FLOYD, RICO STATE BY
STATE: A GUIDE TO LITIGATION UNDER THE STATE RACKETEERING STATUTES 1-4 (1998).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 5 1 ("It is the purpose of this Act to
seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime.").
3. NATALIE Y. MOORE & LANCE WILLIAMS, THE ALMIGHTY BLACK P STONE NATION:
THE RISE, FALL, AND RESURGENCE OF AN AMERICAN GANG 169 (2001) ("Congress had
enacted RICO in 1970 to fight organized crime and the mob. Officials realized that they
could use the law beyond that scope, and in the 1980s street gangs increasingly saw RICO
charges leveled against members.").
4. The National Gang Center has compiled a database of all gang-related legisla-
tion in the United States. Only thirteen states are listed as having specific laws to prosecute
gangs: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. See Gang Prosecution, NA-
TIONAL GANG CENTER, http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Legislation/Prosecution (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
5. In addition to RICO, prosecutors can also charge gang members under RICO's
corollary statute, Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR). 18 U.S.C. 5
1959 (2006).VICAR establishes a federal offense for violent crimes committed in further-
ance of a RICO organization, including murder, assault, kidnapping, and threats made in
Racial Bias and RICO's Application
From a prosecutor's perspective, RICO's focus on the criminal ac-
tivity of group enterprises, as opposed to the criminal activity of
individuals, provides major advantages over other criminal laws to combat
gangs.6 RICO's reliance upon enterprise theory enables prosecutors to
introduce all aspects of a gang's history and criminal conduct into evi-
dence.7 The scope of admissible evidence is thus not limited to the
conduct of specific defendants. Punishment for participating in a RICO
enterprise is also more severe than the penalties for the underlying predi-
cate crimes.8 Sentences for the most serious RICO convictions are
especially harsh and can result in mandatory life terms.9 For these reasons,
some prosecutors praise RICO as the preferred weapon for dismantling
'0
gangs.
Recently, legal scholars have focused on RICO's application to
criminal street gangs specifically, questioning whether this application is
justified. As a matter of statutory interpetation, some scholars posit that
Congress intended for RICO to apply exclusively to highly organized
enterprises that infiltrate legitimate businesses, and that criminal street
gangs do not fit this description." Other scholars contend that criminal
connection with a racketeering enterprise. Id. From a prosecutorial perspective, one ad-
vantage of the VICAR statute over RICO is that it requires only one criminal act be
proven, provided that the act is violent and committed to obtain payment from, to gain
entrance to, or to maintain or increase an offender's position in a gang. Id. Charges were
brought under both RICO and VICAR in many of the indictments within the sample of
the empirical study presented in this Article.
6. Marc Agnifilo et al., Investigating and Prosecuting Gangs Using the Enterprise Theory,
U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULL., May 2006, at 15, 22. ("Enterprise theory prosecutions target crim-
inals in their collective groups, rather than focusing on isolated episodes of their criminal
conduct.").
7. Id. at 16 ("Every aspect of the gang and its history-including how it acquired
its territory; how it makes and disposes of its money; how it uses coded language, hand
signals, and graffiti; and who it has killed and why-can be offered in one coherent sto-
ry.").
8. Michael C. Cernovich, Gangs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES,
Vol. 1 1334, 1335 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006) ("One criticism of RICO is that a RICO
defendant faces greater punishment than if he or she had been convicted only of the un-
derlying predicate acts. That is, a RICO defendant who is alleged to have committed two
counts of wire fraud faces greater punishment than if he or she had been prosecuted under
the wire fraud statutes."); Agnifilo et al., supra note 6, at 22 ("An enterprise theory case
provides a full picture of a street gang's criminal activities and the resulting punishment
and deterrence can prove more extensive and effective than stand-alone cases.").
9. John Gibeaut, Gang Busters, 84 A.B.A.J. 64, 65 (1998). For a list and description
of criminal charges under the federal RICO statute, see Ross Bagley et al., Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 901,933-40 (2007).
10. Gibeaut, supra note 9, at 65 (claiming that prosecutors praise RICO as "the pre-
ferred weapon[| for removing gang leaders from the streets").
11. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 CoL-
um. L. REv. 661, 680 (1987) ("[N]owhere in the legislative history is there even a glimmer
of an indication that RICO or any of its predecessors was intended to impose additional
criminal sanctions on racketeering acts that did not involve infiltration into legitimate
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street gangs do not substantially affect interstate commerce, and thus the
government does not have the constitutional authority under the com-
merce clausel 2 to apply RICO to criminal street gangs.
Although these criticisms raise questions concerming the legality of
applying RICO to criminal street gangs, none focus on the troublesome
consequences that RICO's application to gangs may have in terms of race.
This Article brings some of these consequences to light through an em-
pirical study of RICO gang prosecutions. The breadth of the federal
statutory definitions of RICO "enterprise"" and "criminal street gang'
subject a variety of criminal groups with members of any race to prosecu-
tion under RICO as criminal street gangs.16 But in the study, a strong
business."); Note, Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-First Circuit Upholds Application of
RICO to Criminal Gang Not Engaged in Economic Activity, 121 HAnV. L. REV. 1961, 1968
(2008) ("RICO's legislative findings demonstrate that Congress was particularly con-
cerned with the infiltration of legitimate businesses that would necessarily be engaged in
economic activities . ... [Clourts must ... hesitate before they expand the reach of federal
power beyond the bounds deemed prudent or constitutional by the legislature."). Social
scientists have also argued that many criminal street gangs are not sufficiently structured to
qualify as an organized crime groups. See James C. Howell, Menacing or Mimicking? Realities
of Youth Gangs, 2 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 39, 41 (2007); MALCOLM W KLEIN, THE AMERICAN
STREET GANG: ITS NATURE, PREVALENCE, AND CONTROL 61 (1995).
12. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 3. In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held
that the federal government can only regulate activities if they involve instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, channels of interstate commerce, or activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. See Kristina A. Miller, Note, After Gonzales v. Raich: Can RICO be Used to
Prosecute Intrastate Noneconomic Street Gang Violence, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 197 (2010); Robert
Heberle, Comment, RICO After Raich: The Commerce Clause after Federal Prosecution of
Street Gangs, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 499 (2009); Brian Nisbet, What Can RICO Not
Do?: RICO and the Non-Economic Intrastate Enterprise that Perpetuates Only Non-Economic
Racketeering Activity, 99 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 509, 539 (2009); Matthew Hardwick
Blumerstein, Note, RICO Overreach: How the Federal Government's Escalating Offensive Act
Against Gangs has Run Afoul of the Constitution, 62 VAND. L. REV. 211, 236 (2009); Frank
D'Angelo, Turf Wars: Street Gangs and the Outer Limits of RICO's "Affecting Commerce" Re-
quirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2075 (2008); Note, supra note 11. But see Lesley Suzanne
Bonney, Comment, The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs:A Proper Application of
RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 579 (1993).
14. Under federal law, a RICO "enterprise" is "any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006).
15. Although not defined under RICO, "criminal street gang" is defined under
federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 521 (2002) ("'Criminal street gang' means an ongoing group,
club, organization, or association of 5 or more persons (A) that has as 1 of its primary
purposes the commission of 1 or more of the criminal offenses described in subsection (c);
(B) the members of which engage, or have engaged within the past 5 years, in a continu-
ing series of offenses described in subsection (c); and (C) the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce.").
16. See Brian Slocum, RICO and the Legislative Supremacy Approach to Federal Crimi-
nal Lawmaking, 31 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 639, 643 (2000) ("Because RICO, as drafted, is such a
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majority (approximately 86%) of the prosecuted gangs was affiliated with
one or more racial minority groups (Black, Latino, or Asian). A similarly
large percent (approximately 83%) of the prosecuted individuals were tied
to gangs affiliated with one or more racial minority groups.
Some scholars and practitioners would argue that these findings sub-
stantiate the idea that gangs are comprised mostly of racial and ethnic
minorities.1 8 This Article challenges and problematizes this factual assump-
tion by examining the social processes that underlie the labeling of certain
groups as "gangs" for RICO purposes. This Article maintains that this la-
beling may be driven by systemic racial biases that marginalize entire
racial minority groups and privilege nonimmigrant White communities.
These systemic biases are characterized by converging constructions of
race and crime that fuse perceptions of gang-related crime with images of
racial minorities. Conflating gang activity with racial minorities enables
the government to rely upon denigrating racial stereotypes in order to
engage in racial profiling and conduct sweeping arrests of racial minorities
under RICO. Moreover, nonimmigrant White criminal offenders are
shielded from being conceptualized as gang members or affiliates for
RICO purposes, and mainstream White communities are protected from
the stigma of having gang problems.20
broad and abstract statute, it is capable of extending to a number of different types of con-
duct in a wide range of circumstances.").
17. See infra Part Ill.B.
18. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 11, at 29 ("Most gangs-not all-are composed of
homogenous racial and ethnic minorities. Principally they are Hispanic or black, with an
increase recently in Asian and other groups."); A.J. Reiss & J.A. Roth, Perspectives on Vio-
lence, in CRIME: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 173, 182 (Philip Bean ed., 2003)
("Most youth gangs are found in inner cities, in areas of poverty, physical deterioration,
and institutional breakdown. Because racial and ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated
in such areas, many-but not all-gangs are comprised of minority youths.").
19. Cf MICHAEL PICKERING, STEREOTYPING: THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 73
(2001) ("[Tlhose who are 'othered' are unequally posited in relation to those who do the
'othering.' The latter occupy a privileged space in which they can define themselves in
contrast to the Others who are so designated as different, with this designation reinforcing
and prolonging the inequalities involved by seeming to confirm and prove them.").
20. See MALCOLM W KLEIN:THE AMERICAN STREET GANG 87 (1995) ("The advent of
street gangs to a community is not a happy occurrence. It suggests that the community has
failed in its task of socializing some portions of its youth .... Social agencies, schools, and
the justice system appear impotent and thus face a public relations problem on top of their
gang problem."); Linda M. Schmidt, Gangs as a Social Structure: Wiat Law Enforcers Need to
Understand, in GANGS AND LAw ENFORCEMENT 21, 27 (Linda M. Schmidt & James T.
O'Reilly eds., 2007) (stating that the stigma of having gangs in cities influences many
cities to ignore that they have gang problems); Marjorie S. Zatz & Edwardo L. Portillos,
Voices fron the Barrio: Chicano/a Gangs, Families, and Conununities, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 381
(2000) (stating that gang problems bear a stigma that make communities less attractive to
businesses, which exacerbates the lack of economic opportunities in communities suffer-
ing from gang violence).
SPRING 2012] 307
Michi2an journal of Race & Law
Some criminologists have argued that the descriptive records of, and
the empirical research conducted by, law enforcement often underestimate
and sometimes ignore White involvement in gangs. 2 1 Criminologists have
further contended that empirical research on gangs suffers from sampling
biases caused by the exclusion of White gang members as subjects and the
exclusive recruitment of subjects from racial minority gangs and
neighborhoods. 22 A 1998 multisite study by Finn-agge Esbensen and L.
Thomas Winfree supports the legitimacy of these arguments. 23 Esbensen
and Winfree conducted a survey of 5,935 eighth-grade students in forty-
two schools in eleven cities across the United States. The researchers
found that, contrary to popular perception, one in four gang members
identified as White.2 4 This percentage excluded an additional 15% of
subjects that society would likely perceive as White, but were categorized
as "Other" for having self-identified as American, Italian, German,
Portuguese, and other ethnicities.25 From this finding, other criminologists
have inferred that the racial composition of gangs varies considerably by
geographic locality: they posit that gang members are mostly White in
predominantly White communities, and mostly racial minorities in
neighborhoods with predominant minority populations.26
These critiques put forth by criminologists illustrate that bias can
produce racially skewed depictions of gang phenomena. Based on this
view, this Article's analysis focuses on two related systemic racial biases
that may drive the high representation of racial minorities in RICO gang
prosecutions. First, cultural stereotypes have created a very narrow con-
ception of the term "gang" that is fused with violent images of racial
27minorities. Gang stereotypes disadvantage racial minorities by bringing
specific criminal groups tied to racial minorities, such as the Bloods, the
Crips, MS-13, and the Mexican Mafia, to the forefront of law enforce-
ment and prosecutors' gang radars. Gang stereotypes also make make law
enforcement, prosecutors, and members of society more prone to assume
that crimes committed by groups of racial minorities-especially Blacks,
Latinos, and Asians in urban neighborhoods-are gang related, whereas
crimes committed by groups of nonimmigrant White individuals are not
gang related. The Article will show that language within some of the
21. See Finn-agge Esbensen & L. Thomas Winfree, Race and Gender Diferences Be-
tween Gang and Nongang Youths: Results from a Multisite Survey, 15 JusT. Q. 505, 510 (1998).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 516.
24. Id. at 517.
25. Id.
26. Howell, supra note 11, at 42-43.
27. See Howell, supra note 11, at 42 ("The myth, mainly a product of broadcast
media, alleges that youth gang members are typically comprised of black inner-city
males."); Esbensen & Winfree, supra note 21, at 505 (stating that the sterotypical image of a
gang member is an African-American or Hispanic male).
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RICO indictments suggests that the government has targeted relatively
small and local groups of racial minority offenders, provided names for
the groups, and labelled the groups as gangs even though the suspects dis-
agreed with "gang" labels. 28 These cases illustrate that racial stereotypes
can shape the ways in which the government constructs gang phenomena.
The way that RICO is being applied to White-affiliated gangs casts
further doubt on whether the statute's application (and thus the prosecu-
tion of gangs) is a racially unbiased process. The empirical study indicates
that a specific categorization scheme governed the smaller percentage
(approximately 13%) of White-affiliated criminal groups in the sample
that were conceptualized as gangs and prosecuted under RICO.29 All but
one of the White-affiliated gangs fell into three categories: international
organized crime groups, motorcycle outlaw gangs, and White supremacist
prison gangs. As the analysis will argue, despite being White-affiliated, the-
se criminal groups have been ostracized in ways that distance them from
1 30 Tegv
other nonimmigrant White offenders and law-abiding citizens. The gov-
ernment may therefore implicitly or explicitly rely upon this
categorization scheme in order to shield nonimmigrant White offenders,
such as groups ofWhite youth in rural or suburban areas, from being con-
ceptualized as gangs for RICO purposes. In practice, this reliance can
harm communities with White gang problems by preventing the govern-
ment from intervening to curb gang-related crime within those
communities.
Second, new fears of criminality involving migrants and immigrants
from Mexico, Central America, and South America have spawned a new
term: the "transnational gang."" These increasing concerns over transna-
tional gangs have inspired partnerships between local, state, and federal
law enforcement agencies and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE).32 Created in February 2005, Operation Community Shield (OCS)
28. See infra Part [V.A.
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. This argument is developed in more detail. See infra Part IVA.
31. See ELANA ZILBERG, SPACE oF DETENTION: THE MAKING OF A TRANSNATIONAL
GANG CRISIS BETWEEN Los ANGELES AND SAN SALVADOR 55 (2011) (arguing that "the pri-
mary threat to national security is no longer encoded in communism but rather in the
intersection of criminality and immigration" and that "the convergence of immigration
and criminal law is 'central to the production of the transnational gang crisis.' ") Various
definitions have been put forth for the term "transnational gang."Transnational gangs tend
to have one or more of the following characteristics: (1) the gangs are active in more than
one country; (2) the crimes committed by gang members in one country are planned by
gang leaders in another country; (3) gang members move from place to place and adapt to
new localities; (4) the crimes transcend national borders. See, e.g. CELINDA FRANCO, CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE MS-13 AND 18TH STREET GANGS: EMERGING
TRANsNATIONAL GANG THREATS? 2 (2008), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/crs/rl34233.pdf.
32. See Gangs and Crine in Latin America, Hearing Before the Subconim. on the W Heni-
sphere of the H. Commnn. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 22-25 (2005) [hereinafter Gangs and
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combines the resources of ICE and federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment agencies in order to combat transnational gang violence and illegal
immigration.33 RICO is one tool that law and immigration enforcement
can use during OCS operations in order to conduct sweeping arrests of
alleged gang members and gang affiliates.
Due to its structure, OCS operations overwhelmingly target racial
minorities from Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Carib-
bean. As the Article will argue, law and immigration enforcement officers
are using vague and subjective standards during OCS operations to distin-
guish gang members/affiliates from offenders who are not affiliated with
gangs, and gang members/affiliates from innocent people.34 Complaints
are surfacing of immigration and police officers entering predominantly
Latino neighborhoods and stopping, questioning, searching, detaining, and
arresting Latinos with no reasonable basis to believe that these individuals
are criminal offenders, illegal immigrants, or gang members/affiliates. The
convergence between immigration and gang enforcement is therefore
enabling law enforcement to use concerns regarding transnational gangs as
a pretext to engage in illegitimate practices of racial profiling and to con-
duct sweeping arrests of racial minorities under RICO.
The points above articulate the damaging consequences of gang ste-
reotyping in the context of RICO prosecutions for all races, especially for
Latinos, Blacks, and Asians. But as the analysis of this Article will show,
racial stereotyping is not a new feature of RICO's history.35 RICO's legis-
lative history suggests that racial stereotyping was a key factor motivating
RICO's enactment.3 6 The federal statute was enacted to facilitate sweep-
ing indictments against members of La Cosa Nostra ("the Mafia"), a
criminal cartel comprised mostly of individuals of Italian and Sicilian de-
Crime in Latin America] (testimony of John P. Torres, Deputy Assitant Director, Human
Smuggling and Public safety Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security) (describing Operation Community Shield, one such
partnership, as a response to problems concerning "alien gang crime" in the United States).
See id. at 26 (prepared ofJohn P. Torres, Deputy Assitant Director, Human Smuggling and
Public safety Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security) (stating that "[At ICE] we recognize that no single law enforcement
agency can win the fight against transnational street gangs. ICE is working closely with a
number of agencies and organizations under Operation Community Shield. Such cooper-
ation is critical to the suceess of the initative.").
33. See Operation Community Shield/Transnational Gangs, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CusToms ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/conununity-shield/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2012).
34. See infra Part V.B.
35. A historical analysis of RICO's enactment will be provided infra Part II.
36. See infra Part II.
Racial Bias and RICO's Application
scent. Due to hostility against new irumigrant populations, 7 Italians and
Sicilians were considered neither White nor American. 8
Some scholars may explain RICO's enactment in terms of the broad
expansion of federal criminal laws during the second half of the twentieth
century.39 But the included historical analysis makes it difficult to deny the
connection between RICO, racial subordination, and the protection of
mainstream White America. The urgent need for a federal statute to pro-
tect American society from criminal groups like the Mafia (Italian and
Sicilian "outsiders") has transformed into an urgent need for a federal
statute to protect American society from criminal groups like the Bloods,
Crips, and MS-13 (Black and Latino "outsiders").
Before proceeding, I want to recognize at the outset that it may be
impossible to prove to some readers' satisfaction that RICO gang prose-
cutions disproportionately target racial minorities. As the methodology
section will discuss, this type of claim is incredibly difficult to prove given
the severe limitations of available data on RICO gang prosecutions. 4 0 The
Department of Justice (DOJ) neither compiles nor releases the names or
racial affiliations of the gangs prosecuted under RICO. Moreover, the
DOJ does not release data on the number of criminal groups that it
chooses not to conceptualize as gangs or to prosecute under RICO, even
though these groups may qualify as gangs and be eligible for RICO pros-
ecution.4 1 For these reasons, the presented empirical data does not
definitively prove that RICO gang prosecutions are driven by systemic
racial bias. Rather, in making particular observations about patterns in the
data, I am merely suggesting that the study findings cast considerable
doubt over whether the current application of RICO to prosecute gangs
is a racially unbiased process.
Part I of this Article provides background on the elements of a RICO
claim as applied to criminal street and prison gangs. Part II offers a histori-
cal analysis of the role of racial stereotyping during RICO's enactment. Part
37. See infra notes 94-95.
38. MARCELLA BENCIVENNI, ITALIAN IMMIGRANT RADICAL CULTURE:THE IDEALISM OF
THE SOVVERSIVI IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890-1940 8 (2011) ("To Anglo-Saxon Americans,
the looks, habits, and cultural traditions of the new immigrants appeared backward, primi-
tive, and ultimately inferior. Italians were seen as not only of a lower stock, but also
frequently not as 'white.' "). For an analysis of race issues and new Italian Immigrants of
the late Ninteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, see generally, DAVID R. ROEDIGER,
WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: How AMERICA'S IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE. THE STRANGE
JOURNEY FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO THE SuBURBs (2006).
39. For an analysis of the expansion of the U.S. federal criminal law, see DOUGLAS N.
HusAle, OVERCRIMINALIZATION:THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw (2008).
40. These limitations will be discussed infra Part Il.A.
41. During the study, these points were confirmed by contacts with representatives
in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Violent Gang Task Forces and DOJ's Orga-
nized Crime and Gang Section. For ethical reasons, the names of those contacts remain
anonymous.
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III presents the methods and the results of the empirical study on RICO
gang prosecutions. Part IV discusses these results in terms of systemic ra-
cial biases that may underlie RICO's application to criminal street and
prison gangs. The conclusion recommends that the government (especial-
ly law enforcement and prosecutors) be more transparent about the
process by which it labels group criminality as gang-related, and calls for
new enforcement strategies that prevent RICO from operating as an in-
strument of racial subordination in gang prosecution contexts.
I. ELEMENTS OF A FEDERAL RICO CLAIM AS APPLIED
TO CRIMINAL STREET AND PRISON GANGS
Since its enactment, RICO has been a controversial law.4 2 The feder-
al statute has been used to prosecute a broad range of activities, including
government corruption, white-collar crime, violence, and drug crimes.43
RICO's elements and prohibited activities are included under 18 U.S.C.
5 1962." In short, there are three elements that the government must estab-
lish in order to prosecute an alleged gang member or gang affiliate under
RICO: (1) the defendant must be directly or indirectly employed by or
associated with an enterprise; (2) the defendant must have engaged in a pat-
tern of racketeering activity; and (3) the crimes conunitted by the
defendant must have affected interstate or foreign commerce.4 5 As the
analysis below shows, the government's burden of proof to establish each of
these elements is fairly low.
42. See Slocum, supra note 16, at 643.
43. See JAY S. ALBANESE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 197 (3d ed. 1996) ("Alt-
hough this statute was designed to combat organized crime infiltration of legitimate
business, it has since been employed to prosecute criminal activities by a county sheriff's
department, the Philadelphia traffic court, abortion protesters, a state tax bureau, the Ten-
nessee governor's office, and the Louisiana Department ofAgriculture. Clearly, the use of
RICO has been extended to encompass all forms of organized and white-collar crime.");
D'Angelo, supra note 13, at 2084 ("The first wave of expansion extended RICO into the
areas of government and corporate corruption."); MICHAEL D. LYMAN & GARY W POrrER,
ORGANIZED CRIME 437 (3d ed. 2004) (describing RICO as "an invaluable tool in the fight
against organized crime in the drug trade").
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006) is divided into subsections (a) through (d). In general,
§§ 1962(a) and (b) have not been applied to prosecute criminal street gangs. Section
1962(c) prohibits "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity or collection of unlawful debt." Section 1962(d) prohibits any person
from conspiring to violate the activities listed in Section 1962(a) through (c).
45. 18 U.S.C. %§ 1962(c) (2006).
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A. Existing Criminal Enterprise, Element One
RICO defines an enterprise as "any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 6 This statutory
definition is incredibly broad. In 1981, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the meaning of a RICO enterprise in United States v. Turkette by
defining it as "a group of persons associated together for a common pur-
pose of engaging in a course of conduct."4  In the Court's view, an
enterprise was demonstrated "by evidence of an ongoing organization,
formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as
a continuing unit."48 The Court, however, did not specify the level of or-
ganization or structure that was necessary for a criminal group to be
considered a RICO enterprise.4 This lack of specificity engendered con-
flicting standards among federal courts of appeals.so The majority of circuit
courts required a RICO enterprise to have an organizational structure
distinct from its pattern of racketeering activity.5 Conversely, the Second,
46. 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(4) (2006).
47. United States v.Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
48. Id.
49. Corey P Argust, Douglas E. Litvack & Brant W Martin, Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 961, 976 (2010).
50. See id. ("[Tihe circuits have taken differing positions on the degree of proof
necessary to establish the existence of an enterprise that is sufficiently distinct and separate
from the underlying pattern of racketeering.").
51. Michael Morrissey, Structural Strength: Resolving a Circuit Split in Boyle v. United
States with a Pragmatic Proof Requirement for RICOAssociated-in-Fact Enterprises, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1939, 1967 (2009) ("The majority of circuits have adopted a proof requirement
that the ascertainbale structure in an 'associated-in-fact' enterprise must be separate and
distinct from the pattern of racketeering to guard against the dangers of an overly broad
interpretation."). See also United States v. Riccobene, 709 E2d 214, 224 (3d Cir. 1983)
(requiring a showing of "an existence beyond that which is necessary merely to commit
each of the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses"); United States v. Tillett, 763
E2d 628, 631 (4th Cir. 1985) (inferring the existence of a RICO enterprise based on the
"continuity of structure and personality within the organization"); Calcasieu Marine Nat'l
Bank v. Grant, 943 F2d 1453, 1461 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring that the members of the
enterprise "function as a continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision
making structure"); United States v. Johnson, 440 F3d 832, 840 (6th Cir. 2006) (agreeing
that "Turkette requires the government to prove both the existence of an 'enterprise' and a
'pattern of racketeering activity."'); United States v. Rogers, 89 F3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir.
1996) (quoting Jenings v. Emry, 910 F2d 1434, 1440 (7th Cir. 1990)) (holding that a
RICO "enterprise" is "an ongoing 'structure' of persons associated through time,joined in
purpose, and organized in a manner amenable to the hierarchical or consensual decision-
making"); United States v. Kragness, 830 E2d 842, 855(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that "there
must be an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern
of racketeering activity"); United States v. Smith, 413 F3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005)
(requiring a RICO enterprise to have an "existence beyond that which is necessary mere-
ly to commit each of the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses").
SPRING 2012] 313
Michigan journal of Race & Iw [
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits permitted the government to establish an
existing RICO enterprise based solely on evidence of the predicate
52crimes.
Recently, in Boyle v. United States, 3 the Court seemed to resolve this
circuit split in favor of the minority circuits." The Petitioner in the case
was convicted under RICO for robbing several banks in multiple states
with a group of other people." The trial court permitted the jury to infer
an existing RICO enterprise from the bank robberies themselves, without
finding a distinct organizational structure.1 The Petitioner appealed his
conviction after the trial court refused his request for a jury instruction
requiring the government to prove an existing RICO enterprise through
an organizational structure distinct from the underlying predicate acts. In
upholding the trial court's jury instructions, the Court held that a RICO
enterprise must have an ascertainable structure, but the government need
not prove an organizational structure beyond that inherent in the pattern
of racketeering activity." The Court upheld its position in Turkette that a
RICO enterprise is a continuing unit that functions with a common
purpose, but concluded that the unit need not have a hierarchical struc-
ture and its members need not have fixed roles.5 Rather, the unit's
"decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of meth-
ods."6
In the context of criminal street gang prosecutions, the breadth of
the Boyle decision is further compounded by the ambiguity of the federal
statutory definition of"criminal street gang" and the general lack of con-
52. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F 3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) ("RICO does not
require any particular organizational structure, separate or otherwise."); United States v.
Daidone, 471 E3d 371, 376 (2d Cit. 2006) (holding that proof of predicate acts may be
sufficient to prove an existing RICO enterprise); United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219
E3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cit. 2000) ("[A] RICO enterprise need not possess an 'ascertainable
structure' distinct from the associations necessary to conduct the pattern of racketeering
activity.").
53. 129 S.Ct. 2237 (2009).
54. Sean M. Douglass & Tyler Layne, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,
48 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1075, 1092 (2011) ("The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Boyle,
addressing Turkette, seems to indicate an accord with these latter circuits' [Second, Ninth,
and Eleventh] less demanding approach to establishing association-in-fact enterprises, as
separate proof of structure is not always necessary to prove an enterprise.").
55. Boyle, 129 S.Ct. at 2241-42.
56. Id. at 2242.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2245.
59. Id. at 2242. See also Turkette, 482 U.S. 580, 583 (1981).
60. Boyle, 129 S.Ct. at 2245.
61. Id.
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sensus among policymakers, scholars, and practioners over the definition
of the term.62 Federal law defines a criminal street gang as:
An ongoing group, club, organization, or association of 5 or
more persons-
(A) that has as 1 of its primary purposes the commission of 1
or more of the criminal offenses described in subsection (c);
(B) the members of which engage, or have engaged within the
past 5 years, in a continuing series of offenses described in sub-
section (c); and
(C) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign com-
63merce.
The crimes enumerated under this federal gang statute are conspiracy to
commit or the commission of (1) felonies involving a controlled sub-
stance, and (2) felonies of violence that require the use or attempted use
64
of physical force against a person.
The combination of the broad statutory definitions of RICO "en-
terprise" and "criminal street gang" permit a variety of criminal groups
with members of any race to be conceptualized as criminal street gangs.
On the face of the statute, race is not mentioned explicitly. But as the
empirical study will later show, the criminal groups that the government
has prosecuted as gangs under RICO are primarily affiliated with one or
more racial minority groups.
B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity, Element Two
In order to establish a "pattern of racketeering activity," the govern-
ment must implicate the defendant in at least two predicate acts of
62. There is no universal definition of"criminal street gang." Although federal law
provides a statutory definition, law enforcement agencies often adopt varying definitions
of the term in practice. See, e.g. Donald Lyddane, Understanding Gangs and Gang Mentality:
Acquiring Evidence of the Gang Conspiracy, U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULL., May 2006, at 2. See also
MALCOLM W KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG: ITS NATURE, PREVALENCE, AND CONTROL
20 (1995) (noting the "present state of uncertainty" over gang definitions); ARNOLD P.
GOLDSTEIN, DELINQUENT GANGS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-7 (1991) (providing a
list of different gang definitions that were advanced in the twentieth century); GEORGE W
KNox, AN INTRODUCTION TO GANGS 11 (1993) ("Clearly, there have been many loose
definitions of what constitutes a gang in the literature. More precision is needed.").
63. 18 U.S.C. 5 521(a) (2002). Although the statute requires activities to affect inter-
state or foreign commerce, this requirement has been relaxed significantly by many courts.
See infra Part I.C.
64. 18 U.S.C. 5 521(c) (2002).
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racketeering.5 RICO provides an exhaustive list of predicate acts, which
include both state and federal crimes involving violence, fraud, counter-
feiting, drugs, and immigration.6 The defendants need not be convicted
of the underlying predicate acts; offenses of which the defendant has been
acquitted may serve as the basis of a RICO offense. In the empirical
study, the government almost always established this element through
68multiple allegations of violent, drug, and immigration crimes.
C. Interstate or Foreign Commerce, Element Three
A pattern of racketeering activity under RICO must affect interstate
or foreign commerce. After Congress enacted RICO, some courts held
that the enterprise itself, rather than the predicate crimes, must affect in-
terstate or foreign commerce.7 0 Many courts now apply a much less
stringent standard that merely requires an enterprise's predicate acts to
have a de minimis impact on interstate or foreign commerce.7 1 This low
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006).
66. See § 1961(1) (2006).
67. See Douglass & Layne, supra note 54, at 1081.
68. For example, in May 2011, a federal grand jury indicted nineteen members of
Four Block Gang in Schenectady, New York under RICO for predicate acts of attempted
murder, weapons possession, and narcotics distribution. Press Release, US. Dept. of justice,
Indictments Unsealed Charging Four Block Gang Members and Others with Racketeer-
ing and Narcotics Conspiracies (May 26, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nyn/news/1369-2689-929423744.pdf. In April 2011, a federal grand jury in Chica-
go, Illinois convicted four members of the Latin Kings on RICO charges for multiple
predicate acts of drug trafficking, murder, extortion, and other acts of violence. Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Latin Kings' Nationwide Leader, Augustin Zambrano, and
Three Other High-Ranking Gang Members Convicted of RICO Conspiracy and Relat-
ed Crimes in Federal Trial (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
iln/pr/chicago/2011/pr0407_01.pdf. In October 2009, a federal grand jury indicted
twenty-three defendants of the Original Gangsta Killers on RICO charges for multiple
predicate acts of drug trafficking, robbery, and attempted murder. Press Release, U.S. Dept.
ofJustice, Indictment Charges 25 Gang Members and Associates with RICO Conspiracy,
Drug Conspiracy, and Street Gang Enhancement (Oct. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.atf.gov/press/releases/2009/10/102909-ny-25-gang-members-indicted.html.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006).
70. See United States v. Nerone, 563 F2d 836, 853-4 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that
to bring a RICO claim, the government must show that an enterprise affects interstate
commerce). See also Argust, Litvack & Martin, supra note 49, at 979.
71. See United States v. Shryock, 342 E3d 948, 984 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
district court "correctly instructed the jury that a de minimis affect on interstate com-
merce was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under RICO"); United States v. Marino, 277
F3d 11, 35 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that "the government does not need to show that the
RICO enterprise's effect on interstate commerce is substantial"); United States v. Riddle,
249 F3d 529, 537 (6th Cit. 2001) (holding that "a de minimis connection suffices for a
RICO enterprise that 'affects' interstate commerce"); United States v. Miller, 116 E3d 641,
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threshold allows the government to satisfy the interstate and foreign
commerce element of RICO quite easily in cases that involve criminal
street gangs.
Some courts have raised concerns about whether applying this less
stringent standard to organizations that are predominantly noneconomic
in nature, such as criminal street gangs, exceeds the bounds of the com-
merce clause of the U.S. Constitution.7 2 In Wancaush v. United States, the
Sixth Circuit held that a prosecutor could not press RICO charges against
members of a criminal street gang that engaged in violent, but noneco-
nomic, activity. The court held that RICO could only be used within
the bounds of the commerce clause to target a noneconomic organization
when its activities substantially affected interstate commerce.
Not all courts, however, have shared these concerns. In United States
v. Nascimento, the First Circuit explicitly rejected the Sixth Circuit's rea-
soning in Waucaush and upheld the de minimis standard as applied to
criminal street gangs that engage in violent noneconomic activity.75 The
court reasoned that the Sixth Circuit did not apply the canons of statuto-
ry construction appropriately when it interpreted the term "affect" as
requiring a substantial effect on interstate or foreign commerce in cases
involving noneconomic enterprises. Due to this circuit split, the issue of
whether the government must show that the racketeering activities of a
noneconomic enterprise substantially affect interstate commerce remains
Id77
unresolved .
II.THE CENTRALITY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN RICO's ENACTMENT
During the first half of the twentieth century, a highly secretive
and organized criminal cartel-comprised mostly of members of Italian
and Sicilian descent-gained tremendous influence over the American
674 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding "the government need only prove that the individual subject
transaction has a de minimis effect on interstate commerce" to satisfy § 1962(c)).
72. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce ... among the several States."). Some legal commentators have also raised similar
concerns about the constitutionality of prosecuting noneconomic organizations under
RICO. See supra note 13.
73. 380 E3d 251, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2004).
74. Id. at 256.
75. United States v. Nascimento, 491 E3d 25, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2007).
76. Id. at 38 ("[T]he Waucaush court did not employ any of the usual tools of statu-
tory construction. The absence of anything in the reasoning of that court that explains
how it is possible, consistent with sound canons of statutory construction, to read the word
'affect' as possessing two different meanings depending upon additional facts not men-
tioned in the statute itself, makes the decision suspect.").
77. See, e.g.,Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Connerce Clause:A Reconsideration of
the Scope of Federal Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1991, 2006-09 (2008). See also
Nisbet, supra note 13, at 519-20; Blumerstein, supra note 13, at 228.
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economy." The cartel, also known as "La Cosa Nostra" or "the Mafia,"
profited by managing illegal gambling enterprises, selling and distributing
narcotics, and running prostitution rings." It also infiltrated legitimate
businesses by buying them out and conducting underground, black-
market transactions to eliminate competitors.so
The invisibility and secretiveness of the Mafia created an allure that
captivated American society. In response to the increasing economic in-
fluence of the Mafia, Congress held an eight-day hearing on organized
crime in 1951."' Most hearings were untelevised at the time, but three
major television networks interrupted regular programming in order to
812broadcast the organized crime hearings. During the hearings, Senator
Estes Kefauver, the chair of Congress's Special Committee to Investigate
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (also known as the "Kefauver
Committee" after Kefauver himself), 83 explained the severity of organized
crime to the American public and warned that the Mafia already had
tremendous influence in many U.S. cities." The hearings spawned two
decades of congressional deliberation and research on organized crime,
which ultimately led to RICO's enactment in 1970.'
Organized crime was considered a relatively new and salient social
problem when Congress passed RICO, but widespread organized vio-
lence had existed for decades before the statute's enactment. African
Americans were common targets of organized violence for almost one
78. THOMAS A. REPPETTO, AMERICAN MAFIA iX-Xi (2004).
79. Morris Ploscowe, The Significance of Recent Investigations for the Criminal Law and
Administration of Criminal justice, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 806 (1952) ("The Mafia is an
organization of Sicilian origin which specializes in the sale and distribution of narcotics
and in gambling, prostitution, and other rackets based on extortion and violence.").
80. THIRD INTERIM REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. To INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 82-307, at 170 (1951). For a history of La Cosa Nos-
tra's activities and federal prosecutors' attempts to dismantle the organization, see James B.
Jacobs & Lauryn P Gouldin, Cosa Nostra:The Final Chapter?, 25 CRIME &JUST. 129 (1999).
81. REPPETTO, supra note 78, at ix.
82. Id.
83. The Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Com-
merce met in the years 1950-1951. See WILLIAM HOWARD MOORE, THE KAFAUVER
COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME x (1974).
84. THIRD INTERIM REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. To INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, supra note 80, at 1 ("Organized criminal gangs operating in inter-
state commerce are firmly entrenched in our large cities in the operation of many
different gambling enterprises such as bookmaking, policy, slot machines, as well as in
other rackets such as the sale and distribution of narcotics and commercialized prostitu-
tion.").
85. See Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban
Street Gangs: A Proper Application of RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 587 (1993) ("Alt-
hough a full-scale federal investigation of the Mafia began in the early 1950s, the
government struggled for two decades to define an effective means to combat this crimi-
nal organization.").
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hundred years after the Civil War. Many of these violent crimes were
committed by small groups of White individuals, White mobs, and orga-
nized White supremacist groups.8 One study found that approximately
2,500 African Americans were victims of White lynch mobs between
1882 and 1930 in ten Southern states: almost every week, a Black man,
woman, or child was murdered. This violence continued through the
civil rights movement in the 1960s, when mob violence was used as a
way to suppress and deter African Americans from exercising their civil
rights.86
RICO's legislative history suggests that Congress was specifically
concerned about the ability of Mafia members to infiltrate legitimate
business practices and obtain economic and political power." But the
KKK had similar extraordinary influence within the economic and politi-
cal spheres.9o Many politicians and business leaders, both national and
local, were affiliated with the Klan. Like the Mafia, KKK members often
conducted clandestine operations and hid their affiliations with the or-
ganization from the public.9' Despite these parallels between the KKK and
the Mafia, Congress never felt compelled to pass federal legislation to ad-
912
dress mob violence against African Americans. Organized violence
against African Americans was not considered "organized crime" in the
way that we think of the term today.9 3
86. See generally, THE SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Ku KLux KLAN: A HisToRy
OF RACISM ANDVIOLENCE (5th ed. 1997).
87. STEwART EMoRY TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL. OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 ix (1995).
88. S. REP. No. 90-721, at 2 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1839
("The great majority of Americans have either welcomed or peacefully accepted the
movement of Negroes toward full employment of equal rights. Unfortunately, however, a
small minority of lawbreakers has resorted to violence in an effort to bar Negroes from
exercising their lawful rights . . . Acts of racial terrorism have sometimes gone unpunished
and have too often deterred the free exercise of constitutional and statutory rights.").
89. S. REP. No. 82-307, supra note 80, at 170.
90. MICHAEL WOODIWISS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND AMERICAN POWER 73 (2001)
("Klan dens tended to be headed by the Southern elite. Planters, former generals, lawyers,
merchants, shopkeepers, schoolteachers, and even ministers of churches gave respectability
and legitimacy to a movement that appealed to all levels of Southern White society.").
91. Id. ("[KKK] membership required absolute secrecy and a strange dress code.").
92. See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and
Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 77 (1996) ("Lynching was an
open, notorious crime that the states allowed to continue unchecked by any agents of law
enforcement. This wholesale failure of the states to protect the lives of their Black citizens
cried out for federal action. But throughout most of the history of lynching, the national
government stood idly by"); Mark Tushnet, Essay, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Ln,
88 MICH. L. REV. 49, 69-70 (1989) ("[D]uring the long and unsuccessful effort in the
1920s and 1930s to enact a federal anti-lynching law, several Southern senators and repre-
sentatives openly stated their opposition to such laws in racist terms.").
93. WOODIWISS, supra note 90, at 68 ("Logic and evidence would suggest that this
organized crime, which kept Southern States in grip for almost a century, was more
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If organized crime plagued the United States for decades before
RICO's enactment, then what was so different about the Mafia that
motivated Congress to enact RICO? One significant difference was the
perceived non-White ethnicities of Mafia members.
Members of La Cosa Nostra were of Italian and Sicilian descent. For
decades prior to RICO's enactment, Italian and Sicilian Americans had
been victims of anti-immigrant racism and violence within the United
94
States. New Italian and Sicilian immigrants were ostracized and stereo-
typed as poor and racially inferior.5 Anti-immigrant sentiment enabled
the U.S. government to frame organized crime as a problem of alien con-
spiracy.9 Converging constructions of ethnicity and criminality placed the
blame for organized crime on new immigrants,7 and fostered the belief
that organized crime was perpetuated mostly by members of immigrant
populations." Ironically, most of the individuals who were prosecuted for
organized crime under existing racketeering laws from 1953 to 1959, a
few years after the Kefauver hearings, were neither Italian nor Sicilian."
Evidence of anti-immigrant sentiment and alien conspiracy beliefs is
found in RICO's legislative history. RICO's congressional proponents did
directly pernicious than any other contemporary variety of illegal activity; yet the South
does not appear in the literature on organized crime, except as an entrance point for the
Mafia.").
94. Id. at 97 ("From the 1880s Italians were the largest ethnic group to arrive in the
United States and they received the most violent and abusive welcome of any of the Eu-
ropean newcomers. Reports of beatings, shootings, and lynchings came in from all parts of
the country.").
95. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, ITALIAN AMERICAN 3 (1999); REPPETTO, supra note 78,
at ix ("[N]ewspapers used such phrases as 'cruel, treacherous, vindictive, and violent' to
describe Italians."). See also Elizabeth G. Messina, Psychological Perspectives on the Stigmatiza-
tion of Italian Americans in the American Media, 13 THE PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 87 (2004).
96. See Alan A. Block, The Organized Crime Control Act, 1970: Historical Issues and
Public Policy, 2 THE PUBLIC HisTORIAN 39, 41 (1980); Dwight C. Smith,Jr., Mafia: The Proto-
typical Alien Conspiracy, 423 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 75, 86-87 (Jan. 1976); WOODIWIss, supra note 90, at 94-95 ("Complaints
about the criminal tendencies of foreigners increased in intensity during the nineteenth
century and many political speeches, official reports, and magazine articles suggested that
conspiracies among imnuigrants constituted a threat to the nation.").
97. WOODIWISs, supra note 90, at 94 ("Scapegoat explanations for the problems of
the United States have long been widely accepted by a large proportion of the population,
particularly explanations that pinned the blame on those at the bottom of society, especial-
ly newly arrived migrants and inunigrants.").
98. MICHAEL D. LYMAN & GARY W POTTER, ORGANIZED CRIME 65 (3d ed. 2004)
("The alien conspiracy theory posits that organized crime (the Mafia) gained prominence
during the 1860s in Sicily and that Sicilian immigrants are responsible for the foundations
of American organized crime which is made up of twenty-five or so Italian-dominated
crime families.").
99. Block, supra note 96, at 42. In 1959, the U.S. Department ofJustice released "A
Summary of Successful Racket Prosecutions, 1953-1959." Block's analysis of the report
found that approximately 15% of the individuals convicted under existing racketeering
laws were of Italian and Sicilian descent. Id.
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not hide their disdain for La Cosa Nostra."' During the Congressional
debates, policymakers equated defeating organized crime with defeating
La Cosa Nostra.on In 1965, five years before RICO's enactment, then-
President Lyndon B. Johnson established the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.102 The Commission ex-
plicitly connected organized crime with Italian-American criminal
groups:
Today the core of organized crime in the United States con-
sists of 24 groups operating as criminal cartels in large cities
across the Nation. Their membership is exclusively men of
Italian descent, they are in frequent communication with each
other, and their smooth functioning is insured by a national
body of overseers .... FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]
intelligence indicates that the organization as a whole has
changed its name from the Mafia to La Cosa Nostra.'03
G. Robert Blakey, who drafted the RICO statute as a congressional staffer,
commented in 1990 that the statute "was sort of like George Keenan's
containment policy of the Soviet Union .... We tried it and, by God, it
worked." 0 4 The explicit comparison between RICO and policies of Sovi-
et containment illustrates that RICO was just as much of an attempt to
100. For instance, Attorney General John Mitchell gave the following statement in
favor of federal legislation targeting organized crime before the Committee of the Judici-
ary of the House of Representatives:
Over the last four decades, a criminal minority has put together in the Unit-
ed States an organization which is both an illicit cartel and a nationwide
confederation, operating with comparative immunity from our criminal laws,
and in derogation of our traditional concepts of free enterprise. This confed-
eration, formerly known as the Mafia, but more recently identified as La
Cosa Nostra, owns or controls many illicit businesses in the United States,
and is rapidly increasing its substantial interests in legitimate commerce and
industry.
Hearing on S. 30 and Related Bills Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Conin. on the judiciary, 91st
Cong. 151-57 (1970) (statement ofJohn N. Mitchell, Attorney Gen. of the U.S.).
101. Block, supra note 96, at 40.
102. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being A Criminal, Parts I & II, COLUM. L.
REv. 661, 664 (1987) ("The legislative history of RICO begins with the report of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (the Katzen-
bach Commission) in 1967").
103. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 6-10 (1967).
104. Selwyn Raab, A Battered and Ailing Mafia is Losing its Grip on America, NY TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1990, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/22/us/a-battered-
and-ailing-mafa-is-losing-its-grip-on-america.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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protect the United States from perceived ethnic "outsiders"' 0o as it was a
dedication to fight organized crime. 0 6
In concluding this historical analysis, it is important to acknowledge
that RICO is still used by the federal government today to combat Mafia-
related crime.0 7 These prosecutions, however, were excluded from the
empirical study that follows on RICO gang prosecutions because the
government did not use "gang-specific" language in its anti-Mafia efforts,
even though prosecutors considered Mafia-related crime to be "organized
crime."' 8 The empirical study only included RICO prosecution cases in
which the government used "gang" language or terminology. Although
outside of the bounds of the empirical study, the reasons for this exclusion
may further suggest the complex ways in which "gang" crime has come
to be socially constructed as a phenomenon involving select racial mi-
nority groups, especially Blacks, Latinos, and Asians.
III. RACE AND RICO's APPLICATION TO CRIMINAL STREET AND
PRISON GANGs: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
The findings of the following empirical study suggest that RICO's
history of constructing racial and ethnic minorities as outsiders is repeat-
ing itself in the statute's recent application to criminal street and prison
105. LYMAN & POTTER, supra note 98, at 65 ("Ethnicity is a key to the alien conspira-
cy theory of the organized crime phenomenon.").
106. See, e.g., Carlo Morselli & Lila Kazemian, Scrutinizing Rico, 12 CRITICAL CRIMI-
NOLOGY 351 (2004); WR. Geary, The Creation of RICO: Law as a Knowledge Difusion
Process, CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 329 (2000).
107. See e.g., Press Release, US. Dep't ofJust., Genovese Organized Crime Family Sol-
dier and Associates Indicted on Racketeering Charges, Including Extortion of International
Longshorsemen's Association Members (an. 20, 2011), available at http://
media.nj.com/ledgerupdates-impact/other/Depiro,%2Stephen%20et%/ 2Oal.%20Arrest,%20
Indictment%2OPR.pdf (announcing a recent RICO indictment against members of the
Genovese Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra).
108. To illustrate this point more clearly, consider the following two examples. In
February 2010, the government unsealed a RICO indictment involving the Genovese
Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra. The government never used the term "gang"
to describe La Cosa Nostra itself or subsets of individuals who were affiliated with La
Cosa Nostra. Rather, it used terms such as "crews" and "regimes" to describe collectivities
of individual members of the organized crime unit. The government also used the term
"boss," not "gang leader," to describe the organization's leadership. United States v. Nigro,
Indictment No: S1 09 Cr. 1239, S.D.N.Y, at *2-4, available at http://media.masslive.com/
breakingnews/other/arillotta indictment.pdf. In January 2011, the government unsealed
another RICO indictment involving La Cosa Nostra. Again, the indictment does not em-
ploy "gang" terminology, but rather uses terms such as "crime family, "boss," "crews," and
"regimes," and "decinas" when describing the organizational structure. United States. v.
Balzano, Indictment No: 11 0032 (SCT) (RCM) E.D.N.Y, at *3-4, available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/1-20-201 1-balzano.pdf.
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gangs. Subpart A details the methods and limitations of the study. Subpart
B presents the study findings.
In short, there were five main findings of the study. First, a strong
majority (approximately 86%) of the prosecutions involved gangs that
were affiliated with at least one racial minority group, and a similarly
strong majority (approximately 83%) of prosecutions involved individuals
who were allegedly in racial-minority gangs. Second, all but one of the
prosecuted White-affiliated gangs fell into three categories: (1) interna-
tional organized crime groups, (2) outlaw motorcycle gangs, and (3)
White supremacist prison gangs. Third, there was a higher frequency of
separately named gangs'm that were affiliated with one or more racial mi-
nority groups than separately named White-affiliated gangs. Fourth, there
was a higher frequency of small and local gangs that were affiliated with at
least one racial minority group than were White-affiliated. Fifth, only five
gangs in the sample were subjected to more than three prosecutions un-
der RICO, all of which were Latino- and Black-Affiliated groups labeled
as "more prominent" gangs by the Department of Justice. The implica-
tions of these findings with regard to systemic racial bias will be discussed
in Part IV
A. Methods and Study Limitations
There are very few empirical studies on RICO prosecutions. The
lack of empirical research in this area is mainly due to the fact that the
DOJ does not regularly release detailed statistics on RICO arrests or pros-
ecutions.110 Due to the lack of available data, criminologists have had to
create their own data sets in order to study RICO's application.
To date, three criminological studies on RICO's application in
criminal contexts have been published. None of these studies specifically
examines RICO's application to gang prosecutions. In one study, the re-
searchers conducted interviews with twenty-three practitioners
109. I define a "separately named gang" as a gang that has its own name.The names
comprising the data were determined by the names that the government used within the
indictments or press releases. It is important to note that having a distinct name does not
mean that a gang is completely independent or excluded from a broader network of gangs.
For instance, one of the indicted gangs in the sample, the Rollin' 60 Neighborhood Crips
(see Appendix) is a street gang based in Los Angeles, California. The gang initially formed
as a faction of the original Crip gang in 1972 and has grown since. Although the gang can
be tied to a broader national network of Crip gangs, the Rollin' 60s Neighborhood Crip
gang is very much its own entity.
110. See Blumenstein, supra note 13, at 217 (noting that "aggregate statistics are not
available regarding the frequency with which the Justice Department brings RICO charg-
es-let alone RICO charges against gangs in particular"). During the study, these points
were confirmed by contacts with representatives in the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Violent Gang Task Forces and the Department of justice's (DOJ) Organized Crime
and Gang Section. For ethical reasons, the names of those contacts remain anonymous.
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(prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges) who handled RICO cases in
order to determine the utility and practical effects of the statute." In the
other two studies, the researchers scrutinized RICO's application through
a subset of federal circuit and district court cases that were available on
Westlaw and LexisNexis.112
It would have been impossible to quantify on a broad scale the racial
affiliations of the gangs prosecuted under RICO from the methods used
in these existing studies. Making generalizations about the racial affilia-
tions of gangs prosecuted under RICO from a limited subset of
prosecutor interviews might have produced inaccurate and skewed racial
representations. Moreover, it would have been problematic to rely strictly
upon the cases that are available on Westlaw and LexisNexis because de-
fendants often accept plea bargains in RICO cases, and thus the cases do
not result in published trial or appellate court opinions.13
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has provided some statis-
tics on RICO operations against gangs, reporting a total of 595 RICO
indictments returned against "violent gangs" between the years 2001 to
2010."4 It is unclear, however, whether this quantity includes superseding
indictments"5 against the same defendants in specific cases." 6 The FBI also
111. Martin G. Urbina & Sara Kreitzer, The Practical Utility and Ramifications of RICO:
Thirty-TwoYearsAfter Its Implementation, 15 CRIM.J. POL REV. 294,294 (2004).
112. John Dombrink & JamesW Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution:The Use and Abuse of
Rico, 16 RUTGERS L. J. 633, 642-44 (1985) (using the subset of eighty federal appellate
cases to reach conclusions about applying RICO in criminal cases). The scholars who
performed this empirical study justified their methodology by arguing that: (1) all of the
opinions are published, which permits easy access to data, (2) other litigation studies also
rely upon federal appellate review; (3) appellate courts address problematic issues that arise
in doctrine, and thus serve as a reliable source to examine whether a statute is being used
creatively or abused. Id. at 643-44. Carlo Morselli & Lila Kazemian, Scrutinizing Rico, 12
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 351, 359 (2004). The researchers in this study created a random
sample of 166 cases across three decades (1970-2000). Id. The researchers intended to
include an equal number of federal trial and appellate court cases. Id. Due to the lack of
district court transcripts on Westlaw, however, the final subset of cases was comprised pri-
marily of appellate cases (152 cases or 92%). Id.
113. Donald Crump, Criminals Don't Pay: Using Tax Fraud to Prohibit Organized Crime,
9 Hous. Bus.TAx. L.J. 386, 391 (2009) ("Because RICO charges are easy for the prosecu-
tion to prove, defendants will often choose a plea bargain.").
114. Violent Gang Initiatives, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Aug. 2011), http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-11/just-the-facts-1/violent-gang-
initiatives (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
115. A superseding indictment is an indictment that is filed after an original indict-
ment in a case. It is usually based upon events that occur after the indictment has been
filed, which change the original nature of the indictment.
116. A superseding indictment is often used in federal court to drop charges or par-
ties, or to make minor corrections to the original indictment that leave the original
charges intact. See United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 240 (1985). I excluded
superseding indictments from the sample if they involved the same defendants. It was not
uncommon for two or three indictments to be returned against the same defendants over
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did not specify which criminal groups it considered to be "violent gangs."
More importantly, it was impossible to make inferences about race from
this data because the FBI did not release the names or the primary racial
affiliations of the prosecuted violent gangs.
Given these limitations, it was necessary to use other methods in or-
der to investigate race in the context of RICO gang prosections. I used
four sources to gather information on RICO gang prosecutions. First,
using Westlaw, I collected all of the articles published in major local and
national American newspapers between January 1, 2001, and January 1,
2011, containing the terms RICO, gang, and indict (along with any deriva-
tives of these terms such as racketeering, gangs and indicted). Second, I used
Westlaw case searches to find any RICO gang prosecutions between 2001
and 2011 that were not reported in the news sources available onWestlaw.
Third, I used Google to conduct targeted searches within yearly ranges
(January 1, 2001-January 1, 2002; January 1, 2002-January 1, 2003, etc.)
to find any gang prosecutions that I did not retrieve on Westlaw. Fourth, I
used the DOJ website to gather reports of gang prosecutions that I did
not retrieve from any of the other sources. I listed all of the gathered cases
in a separate database.
From this list, I used Google and the Public Access to Court Elec-
tronic Records (PACER) to obtain electronic copies of the RICO gang
indictments. To avoid counting a particular gang prosecution more than
once, the sample excluded superseding indictments involving the same
defendants in a particular case. I coded each indictment in a separate Ex-
cel database based on (1) the year of the indictment, (2) the state of the
indictment, (3) the name of the gang, (4) the primary racial affiliation of
the gang, and (5) the number of the indicted gang members and affiliates
under RICO.'17 I used the following categories to code race: Black, Lati-
no, Asian, White, Mixed, and Other. I included Black, Latino, Asian, and
White as racial categories because the racial and ethnic compositions of
most prosecuted gangs seemed to fit within these categories."8 I included
a Mixed category for gangs that were affiliated with more than one racial
group, and an Other category to capture the racial affiliations of gangs
that did not fit within the other categories.
the course of a few years in a single case. If the FBI's reported numbers included supersed-
ing indictments, then this statistic would be higher than if such indictments had been
excluded. From the available data, it is unclear how much higher. However, one could
surmise from the frequency of superseding indictments that the difference would be con-
siderable.
117. Many indictments brought forth charges under RICO and other federal crimi-
nal laws. Therefore, an indictment could have included both indictees charged under
RICO and indictees not charged under RICO. In the sample, I excluded named individu-
als who were indicted for violating other federal criminal laws, but not RICO.
118. See IRVING A. SPERGEL,THEYOUTH GANG PROBLEM:A COMMUNiTy APPROACH 61-
69 (Oxford University Press, Inc., 1995) (dividing gang subcultures into Black, Hispanic,
Asian and Pacific Island, and White gang subcultures).
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I relied upon four indicators to make inferences about the racial af-
filiations of the gangs. First, I inferred race from the name of the gang; the
Mexican Mafia, for instance, is a Latino-affiliated gang. Second, I made
racial inferences from the surnames of the indicted gang members. If an
indictment included gang members who each had Latino surnames (e.g.,
Lopez, Alvarez,Vasquez, Ortiz), then I inferred that the gang was Latino-
affiliated. Third, I made inferences of race from the ideologies of the
gangs. For instance, I inferred that White supremacist prison gangs were
White-affiliated from their professed beliefs. Fourth, I made inferences of
race from publicly available pictures and videos of indicted gang members:
if, for example, released mugshots of prosecuted gang members/affiliates
from a case depicted all Black individuals, then I inferred that the gang
was Black-affiliated.
I was confident about my inferences of race in most cases, but rely-
ing upon these indicators to make such inferences was not a foolproof
process. The role of personal judgment in making those inferences created
an unavoidable potential for error. In order to increase the accuracy of my
inferences, I relied upon more than one indicator for each case whenever
possible.
It is important to underscore that I did not use these indicators to
make inferences about the racial identities of the indicted gang mem-
bers/affiliates. Gangs that are predominantly affiliated with one racial
group may have members who identify as multiracial or identify with a
different race from the primary racial affiliation of their gangs. Based on
the available data, I was not confident inferring racial identities at the in-
dividual level: the risk of imposing inaccurate racial identities upon
individual subjects was too high. An individual with a Latino surname, for
instance, may identify as multiracial if he or she has parents of different
races. From the limited information in the indictment, I would have erro-
neously assumed that the individual identified as Latino. Therefore, the
data pertaining to individual indictees in the empirical study are centered
on the primary racial affiliation of their gangs, not their individual racial
identities. Put another way, a value of"25-Latino" in a case would reflect
twenty-five indictees who were tied to a Latino-affiliated gang, not that
twenty-five Latino gang members and affiliates were indicted.
Since the study presents numerical data, some readers may wonder
whether the findings are "statistically significant." Tests of statistical signifi-
cance enable researchers to determine whether they would have received
similar results if the entire population, as opposed to a sample of the
population, had been included in the study."' Significance tests assume
that the researcher has selected a random sample of cases.120 One limita-
119. MICHAEL K. LE Roy, R-ESEARCH METHODS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: AN INTRODUC-
TION USING MICROCASE 182 (7th ed. 2009).
120. Id.
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tion of the empirical study is that the sample of RICO gang prosecutions
is not random. Since I relied upon search engines and websites to gather all
of the available RICO gang indictments, the sample excluded RICO gang
prosecutions that were not publicly available. Given the lack of available
statistics on RICO gang prosecutions, it is unclear how many prosecutions
remain outside of the public realm and are thus excluded from the study.
Because of this limitation, I could not guarantee the representativeness of
the sample. In order to refrain from overstating the accuracy of my results, I
did not perform significance tests with the numerical data. The study's find-
ings should be therefore viewed with caution. Also, the findings should not
be applied to support generalizations involving the application of RICO
in other contexts or the application of different federal statutes to criminal
street and prison gangs.
Although the study findings do not provide definitive statistical
proof of racial bias, I argue that they raise considerable doubt as to wheth-
er the application of RICO to prosecute gangs is a racially unbiased
process. However, readers should take into consideration that since the
study sample only included publicly released RICO gang prosecutions, it
is possible that this disturbing trend may not apply to unpublicized cases
or prosecutions supported by sealed indictments. One finding that under-
cuts this possibility is that the media reported some of the cases originally
supported by sealed indictments once the government unsealed them. For
instance, on August 8, 2005, the Associated Press reported that fourteen
Latino gang members of Surefios-13 (SUR-13) were arrested in Geor-
gia.121 A federal grand jury had returned a sealed indictment on July 12,
2005, and it was not unsealed until a few days prior to the news report in
order to allow law enforcement authorities to coordinate arrests. 122 The
multi-year time span of the empirical study (2001-2011) increased the
likelihood that the study would capture RICO prosecutions that were
originally supported by sealed indictments.
There were two additional potential biases that the empirical study
could not avoid due to its reliance upon publicly available indictments.
For the reasons discussed below, the strength of these potential biases is
unclear. First, law enforcement and prosecutors may have resisted publi-
cizing crackdowns against White-affiliated gangs in order to shield White
neighborhoods and communities from the stigma of having gang prob-
lems.'23 One could surmise, however, that if law enforcement and
prosecutors were so concerned with shielding White communities from
being tied to gang violence, then they would have avoided labeling White
criminal groups as street gangs altogether. Second, media sources may be
121. See Associated Press, Atlanta Gang Members Arrested on Racketeering Charges, Ac-
CESSNORTHGA.com (Aug. 8, 2005, 3:45 AM), http://12.162.160.186/detail.php?n
=141514.
122. Id.
123. See Klein, supra note 20; Schmidt, supra note 20; Zatz & Portilos, supra note 20.
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more prone to cover RICO prosecutions against racial minority gangs
because of consumer demands for stories of sensationalized racial gang
violence.124 Even if this is the case, if the government does not conceptu-
alize White-affiliated criminal groups as gangs for RICO purposes, then
these consumer demands would not change the racial affiliations of the
prosecuted gangs.
Despite limitations, the employed methods were the best fit for the
empirical study given the shortcomings of the alternative methods and
the lack of available data on RICO gang prosecutions. There were also
advantages in using these methods. Newspaper articles often reported the
exact number of alleged street gang members who were indicted under
RICO, which I was then able to crosscheck with the number of gang
members listed in the electronic copies of the indictments. Moreover, the
prosecutions were likely to receive media coverage because of the seri-
ousness of gang violence and the large-scale nature of RICO operations.
Thus, even though the study does not provide statistically significant find-
ings, its conclusions were based on a robust sample constructed from
multiple reliable sources.
B. Results
The study sample consisted of 160 prosecutionsl2 brought against
115 separately named1 26 criminal street and prison gangs and 2,915 alleged
124. Lyddane, supra note 62, at 2 ("The news media and entertainment industry have
sensationalized gang crimes and the gang lifestyle to the point that it has become part of
mainstream America.").
125. In determining whether a prosecution qualifed as a separate case for the study, I
considered factors including, but not limited to, (1) whether the prosecution involved a
distinct subset of a particular gang; (2) whether the prosecution included new defendants
from other RICO prosecutions; (3) whether the prosecution was supported by its own
law enforcement investigation; (4) whether the RICO prosecution had its own place on
the judicial docket, and was thus not part of another already existing RICO gang prosecu-
tion. Based on these factors, it was possible for a single gang to be represented in more
than one case within the study if the prosecutions involved different subsets of the same
gang. For instance, Case 4 of the empirical study involved six members of MS-13 who
were indicted under RICO in 2011 by federal authorities in the District of Columbia. See
Appendix. Case 13 of the study involved 7 members of MS-13 who were indicted under
RICO that same year by federal authorities in Texas. See Appendix. Both cases involved
the same gang, MS-13. But the cases qualified as different "prosecution cases" because the
prosecutions involved different subsets of the same gang.They prosecutions were also sup-
ported by independent law enforcement investigations and separate indictments that
involved different defendants. Moreover, the cases were to be tried in different federal
district courts.
126. I define a "separately named gang" as a gang that has its own name.The names
comprising the data were determined by the names that the government used within the
indictments or press releases. Having a distinct name does not mean that a gang is com-
pletely independent or excluded from a broader network of gangs. See supra note 109.
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gang members/affiliates. The Appendix contains a list of the gang prosecu-
tion cases and coded variables. The main findings of the study are presented
below. Before presenting these findings, I want to emphasize that this Part
of the Article does not put forth any normative claims or offer any potential
explanations of the data. The analysis of this Part is merely descriptive. The
implications of the data, in addition to any arguments or counterarguments
that arise from the data, will be discussed separately infra Part IV.
Finding 1: A strong majority of the prosecution cases involved gangs
that were affiliated with at least one racial minority group, and a simi-
larly strong majority of prosecutions involved gang members/a iffliates
that were connected to gangs that were affiliated with one or more ra-
cial minority groups.
In the sample, most (approximately 86%) of the prosecution cases
involved gangs that were affiliated with at least one racial minority group
(See Table 1). Most of these cases involved gangs that were affiliated with
one specific group, as opposed to mixed-race gangs. A smaller percentage
(approximately 14%) of the prosecutions involved predominantly White-
affiliated gangs.
TABLE 1
RICO GANG PROSECUTION CASES BASED ON THE PRIMARY RACIAL









The study yielded somewhat similar results in terms of the number
of prosecuted gang members and affiliates. A similarly strong majority
(approximately 83%) of these individuals were connected to gangs that
were primarily affiliated with at least one racial minority group (see Table
127. A breakdown of gang prosecution cases based on the predominant racial affilia-
tions of the prosecuted gangs is available on request from the author.
128. To remind readers, given the definition of "prosecution cases," it was possible for
a major gang to generate more than one frequency in the sample. See infra note 125. For
instance, the Aryan Brotherhood generated a frequency of 3 for White-affiliated gang
prosecution cases because three separate prosecutions (one in Texas, two in California)
involving different gang members were brought against factions of the major prison gang.
See cases 42, 145, 158 in Appendix.
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2). Most of these cases also involved individuals who were tied to gangs that
were primarily affiliated with one specific racial minority group, as opposed
to mixed-race gangs. A smaller percentage (approximately 17%) of the pros-
ecutions involved individuals connected to White-affiliated gangs.
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF GANG MEMBERs/AFFILIATES PROSECUTED UNDER RICO










These figures are not conclusive evidence of systemic racial bias, but
they do indicate a high representation of racial minorities in terms of the
prosecuted groups and individuals associated with those groups in the
sample. 130
Finding 2: The prosecuted White-affiliated gangs generally fell into
three categories: (1) international organized crime groups, (2) outlaw
motorcycle gangs, and (3) White supremacist prison gangs.
The sample included twenty-two White-affiliated gangs, which
comprised 13.75% of the total prosecuted gangs in the sample (see Table
1).The data revealed that a specific categorization scheme applied to these
White-affiliated gangs. All but one of the twenty-two White-affiliated
gangs fell into three categories: (1) international organized crime groups,
(2) outlaw motorcycle gangs, and (3) White supremacist prison gangs (see
Table 3). A strong majority of those prosecutions (approximately 82%)
involved the first two categories: outlaw motorcycle gangs and White su-
premacist prison gangs.
129. A breakdown of the number of gang members/affiliates prosecuted under
RICO based on the primary racial affiliations of their gangs is available upon request from
the author.
130. Again, I want to emphasize that at this point of the Article, I am not making any
normative claims or putting forth any interpretations of this data. I acknowledge that some
readers would explain these numbers by arguing that there are more racial minority gangs
than white gangs, and more racial minority gang members than white gang members. I
will address these points infra Part IV
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TABLE 3
RICO GANG PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING WHITE-AFFILIATED
GANGS,l 3' 2001-2011
Frequency of Percentage of White- Percentage of
Gang Type Prosecution Cases Affiliated Gangs Total Gangs
International Organized 3 13.63 1.87
Crime Group
Other 1 4.55 0.62
Outlaw Motorcycle 11 50.00 6.88
Gang
White Supremacist 7 31.82 4.38
Prison Gang
Total 22 100.00 13.75
Finding 3: There was a higher frequency of separately named gangs
that were affiliated with one or more racial minority groups than sepa-
rately named White-affiliated gangs.
The prosecutions in the sample involved 115 separately named
gangs.132 A strong majority (approximately 89%) of the separately named
gangs were affiliated with at least one racial minority group (see Table 4).
There were also just over four times as many separately named Black-
affiliated gangs, and just under three times as many Latino-affiliated gangs,
as White-affiliated gangs (see Table 4).
131. The names of the prosecuted White-affiliated gangs in the sample by category
included: International Organized Crime Groups: Armenian Power, Chicago Outfit, Un-
named Russian Gang; Other The Guardians; Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: Hells Angeles (4
cases) Highwaymen Motorcycle Club, Outlaws (3 cases), Pagan's (3 cases); hite Suprema-
cist Prison Gangs: Aryan Brotherhood (3 cases), Aryan Warriors, Dead Man Incorporated,
Soldiers of the Aryan Culture, Nazi Low Riders.
132. Again, I define a "separately named gang" as a gang that has its own name. The
names comprising the data were determined by the names that the government used
within the indictments or press releases. Having a distinct name does not mean that a gang
is completely independent or excluded from a broader network of gangs. See supra note
126.
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TABLE 4
SEPARATELY NAMED GANGS PROSECUTED UNDER RICO
BASED ON RACIAL AFFILIATION OF THE GANGS, 2001-2011
Finding 4: There was a higher frequency of small and local prosecuted
gangs that were affiliated with at least one racial minority group than
were White-affiliated.
Almost one-third (approximately 31%) of the prosecution cases in
the sample involved small or local criminal street gangs (see Table 5). A
strong majority of those cases (approximately 86%) involved gangs that
were primarily affiliated with Blacks, Latinos, or Asians specifically. Black-
133. The six separately named Asian gangs included: Dragon Family, Lim Organiza-
tion,Tiny Oriental Posse,Tongan Crips,Wang Organization,Yi Ging Organization.
134. The fifty-three separately named Black gangs included: 110 Gang, 662 Boss
Piru, Almighty Vice Lord Nation, Black Guerrilla Family, Bloods, Boot Camp Gang,
Bounty Hunter Bloods/Nine Tech Gangsters, Bricktown Gang, Brighton Brigade, Bright-
on Place/Northview Heights Crips, Bugout Boyz/Nine-Trey Gangsters, Carman Brothers
Crew, Cash Money Brothers, Chain Gang/Wolf Pack, Courtlandt Avenue Crew, Crips,
Double II, Down Below Gang, Dump Squad, Elk Block Gang, Esmond Street Crew, Four
Block Gang, Fruit Town/Brick City Brims, Fulton Hill Hustlers, Gangster Disciples, Har-
lem Boys, Hoover Crips, Josephine Dog Pound, Jungle Junkies, King Mafia Disciples, Lex
Mob, LSP Gang, McGriff Enterprise, Murder Unit, Neighborhood Piru Bloods, New-
burgh Bloods, Newburgh Crew, Original Gangsta Killers (OGK), Page Street Mob,
Pasadena Denver Lane (PDL) Bloods, Patio Crew, Pitch Dark Family, Playboy Bloods,
Pueblo Bishop Bloods, Rollin' 60s Crips, Six Tre Outlaw Gangsta Disciples Folk Nation,
Southside Brims Bloods, Squad Up, Stapleton Crew, Stonehurst Gang, Tree Top Piru
(TTP),West Coast Crips,Woodbine Crew.
135. The thirty-six separately named Latino gangs included: 18th Street Gang, 38th
Street Gang, Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (ALKQN), Azusa 13, Barrio Azteca,
Black Angels, Bronx Trinitarios Gang (BTG), Brown Magic Clica, Brownside Locos, Cis-
neros Organization, Columbia Lil' Cycos, Drew Street Gang, Eastside Gang, Florencia 13,
Forming Kaos, Freeman Street Robbery Organization, Imperial Gangsters, Killing Every
Spot, Lennox 13, Malditos-13, Mexican Mafia, MS-13, Nuestra Familia, Ojeda Organiza-
tion, Pachuco-21, Puente 13, Raza Unida, Riverside Locos, Sur-13,Texas Mexican Mafia,
Texas Syndicate, The Avenues,Varrio Hawaiian Gardens Gang,Vatos Locos,Vineland Boyz,
West Myrtle Street Gang.
136. The seven separately named Mixed gangs included: 10th Street Gang, Bandidos
Biker Gang, Insane Deuces, Mello Organization, Mongols, Unnamed Gang, Wheels of
Soul.
137. The thirteen separately named White gangs are listed supra note 131.
Primary Racial
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and Latino-affiliated gangs were especially represented in this finding. Just
under one in four (approximately 24%) of the total cases in the sample
involved a small or local criminal street gang that was primarily Black- or
Latino-affiliated. These frequencies were much lower than the prosecuted
small/local criminal street gangs that were White-affiliated. Only four of
the small/local gangs were White-affiliated, and three of those gangs were
considered international organized crime groups.
TABLE 5
SMALL OR LOCAL GANGS PROSECUTED UNDER RICO
BASED ON PRIMARY RACIAL AFFILATION
OF THE GANGS, 2001-2011
Frequency of Cases Percentage of Cases
Involving Small or Invoving Gangs with Percentage of Total
Race Local Gangs Similar Racial Affiliation Cases
Asian 4m 66.67 2.50
Black 26' 43.33 16.25
Latino 121Q 18.46 7.50
Mixed 3"' 42.86 1.88
Other 0 0.00 0.00
White 4 12 18.18 2.50
Total 49 - 30.63
Finding 5: Only five gangs in the sample were subjected to more than
three prosecutions under RICO, and all of those gangs involved
Latino- and Black-Affiliated gangs labeled as "more prominent"gangs
by the Department ofJustice.
In the sample, there were only five gangs that were involved in more
than three prosecution cases (see Table 6). Three of these gangs were
138. The four cases involving small and local Asian-affiliated gangs included: Dragon
Family, Lim Organization, Wang Organization, andYi Ging Organization
139. The twenty-six cases involving small and local Black-affiliated gangs included:
Boot Camp Gang, Bricktown Gang, Brighton Brigade, Carman Brothers Crew, Cash
Money Brothers, Chain Gang/Wolf Pack, Courtlandt Avenue Crew, Down Below Gang,
Elk Block Gang, Esmond Street Crew, Four Block Gang, Fulton Hill Hustlers, Harlem
Boys, Josephine Dog Pound, Jungle Junkies, Lex Mob, LSP Gang, McGriff Enterprise,
Murder Unit, Original Gangsta Killers (OGK), Page Street Mob, Patio Crew, Pitch Dark
Family, Squad Up, Stonehurst Gang, and Woodbine Crew.
140. The twelve cases involving small and local Latino-affiliated gangs included: Bronx
Trinitarios Gang (BTG), Brown Magic Clica, Brownside Locos, Cisneros Organization,
Drew Street Gang, Eastside Gang, Freeman Street Robbery Organization, Killing Every
Spot, Ojeda Organization, Riverside Locos,Vineland Boyz, and West Myrtle Street Gang.
141. The three cases involving small and local mixed-race-affiliated gangs included
10th Street Gang, Insane Deuces, and an unnamed gang.
142. The four cases involving small and local White-affiliated gangs inicuded: The
Guardians, Armenian Power, Chicago Outfit, and an Unnamed Russian Gang.
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Latino-affiliated (Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation [ALKQN],
MS-13, and Texas Syndicate) and two of these gangs were Black-affiliated
143(Bloods and Crips). Each of these gangs is identified as a "more promi-
nent" street or prison gang by the Department ofJustice. 14 4
TABLE 6
GANGS PROSECUTED MORE THAN THREE TIMES UNDER RICO, 2001-2011
Percentage of
Number of Cases Invoving
Primary Racial Major Gang Prosecution Gangs With Similar Percentage
Affiliation of Gang Name Cases Racial Affiliation of Total Cases
Latino N = 65
Almighty Latin 8 12.31 5.00
King and Queen
Nation
MS-13 12 18.46 7.50
Texas Syndicate 6 9.23 3.75
Subtotal 26 40.00 16.25
Black N = 60
Bloods'"5  19 31.67 11.88
Crips" 8 13.33 5.00
Subtotal 27 45.00 16.88
Prosecutions against ALKQN, MS-13, and Texas Syndicate com-
prised approximately 40% of all cases involving Latino-affiliated gangs (see
143. It is important to clarify that the prosecuted subsets of these three major
Latino-affiliated gangs did not have their own distinct names. Conversly, many of the
cases involving the Bloods and the Crips involved subsets of those gangs with distinct
names (e.g. "Pueblo Bishop Bloods" and "Hoover Crips"). In some cases, the subsets did
not have a name that tied them directly to the Bloods or the Crips; rather, the federal
government tied the gang subset to the Bloods or the Crips in the prosecution indictment
(e.g., "Double Il" of the Bloods).
144. Street Gangs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ocgs/
gangs/street.htm1 (last visited Apr. 1. 2012) (identifying Almighty Latin King and Queen
Nation, Bloods, Crips, and MS-13 as "more prominent" criminal street gangs that operate
in the United States); Prison Gangs, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/ocgs/gangs/prison.htmi (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (identifying Texas Syndicate as
a one of the "largest" prison gangs that operates in the United States).
145. The subsets of Bloods in the sample included: 662 Boss Piru, Bloods (three
cases), Bounty Hunter Bloods/Nine Tech Gangsters (two cases), Bugout Boyz/Nine-Trey
Gangsters, Double II, Dump Squad, Fruit Town/Brick City Brims, Neighborhood Piru
Bloods, Newburgh Bloods, Newburgh Crew, Pasadena Denver Lane (PDL) Bloods, Play-
boy Bloods, Pueblo Bishop Bloods, Southside Brims Bloods, Stapelton Crew, Tree Top
Piru (TTP).
146. The subsets of Crips in the sample included: Brighton Place/Northview
Heights Crips, Crips (four cases), Hoover Crips, Rollin' 60s Crips, and West Coast Crips.
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Table 6). Moreover, prosecutions involving subsets of the Bloods and the
Crips comprised approximately 45% of all prosecution cases involving
Black-affiliated gangs. The prosecution cases from these five major Latino-
and Black-affiliated gangs comprised almost one-third (approximately
33%) of the total prosecutions.
IV SYSTEMIC RACIAL BIASES UNDERLYING RICO's APPLICATION
TO CRIMINAL STREET AND PRISON GANGS
The data regarding race and RICO gang prosecutions suggest a situ-
ation that calls for explanation: a facially neutral law (RICO) and a
facially neutral concept ("criminal street gang") are being applied to pros-
ecute criminal groups that are predominantly affiliated with racial
minorities.
Some scholars would explain the racial disparity in the data by con-
tending that gangs are comprised mostly of racial minorities. For decades,
criminologists have studied gang subcultures and suggested that gang de-
velopment is a function of social isolation and lack of economic
opportunity.147 Race is related to these factors because persistent racial
discrimination in certain spheres of society, such as employment and
housing, has facilitated the creation of isolated neighborhoods of racial
minority populations with severely limited economic opportunities.
Gangs provide pathways to achieve respect and financial success within
these communities that are marginalized from mainstream society.149
Although the roles of social and economic marginalization in gang
formation should not be disregarded, accepting these factors at face value
to explain the high representation of racial minorities in the data is dan-
gerous and potentially misleading. Social and economic marginalization
may explain the conditions under which gangs are more likely to form,
but they do not explain the social processes by which law enforcement
and prosecutors may come to label particular groups as criminal street
or prison gangs. Strictly resorting to factors of social and economic
147. See FREDERIC THRASHER, THE GANG (1927); ALBERT K. COHEN, DELINQUENT
Boys: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG (1955); RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DE-
LINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1961); Walter B. Miller, Lower Class Culture as a Generating
Miline of Gang Delinquency, 14 J. Soc. ISSUES, 5-20 (1958). See also, JOHN M. HAGEDORN &
MIKE DAVIS, A WORLD OF GANGS: ARMED YOUNG MEN AND GANGSTA CULTURE (2008);
IRVING A. SPERGEL,THEYOUTH GANG PROBLEM:A COMMUNITY APPROACH 161 (1995).
148. See JoHN M. HAGEDORN & MIKE DAVIS, A WORLD OF GANGS: ARMED YOUNG MEN
AND GANGSTA CULTURE (2008); IRVING A. SPERGEL,THEYOUTH GANG PROBLEM:A COMMu-
NITy APPROACH 161 (1995); JAMES DIEGO VIGIL, A RAINBOW OP GANGS: STREET CULTURES
IN THE MEGA-CITY 7 (2002).
149. See HAGEDORN & DAVIS, supra note 148; SPERGEL, supra note 148; VIGIL, supra
note 148.
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marginalization in order to explain the racial disparity in the data risks
neglecting potential illegitimate racial biases that may drive this disparity.
Although not evidence of racial stereotyping per se, there is a clear
connection between race and the groups that the DOJ views as the "more
prominent criminal street gangs" that operate in the United States.'" On
its website, the DOJ lists seventeen such gangs,'" all of which are predom-
inantly affiliated with a single racial minority group: Black, Latino, or
Asian.152 The only White gangs that appear on the DOJ website are mo-
torcycle outlaw gangs and White supremacist prison gangs.
The analysis below discusses two potential systemic biases that may
drive the high representation of racial minorities in RICO gang prosecu-
tions. First, as discussed in Subpart A, cultural stereotypes have created
racially slanted conceptions of the term "gang," which are fused with vio-
lent images of racial minorities. These stereotypes make law enforcement
officers and prosecutors more prone to assume that crimes committed by
groups of racial unorities are gang-related, whereas crimes committed by
groups of nonimmigrant White individuals are not gang related. Second,
as discussed in Subpart B, recent partnerships between irnmigration and
antigang law enforcement units have resulted in RICO gang crackdowns
that target racial nuinority groups exclusively. These practices not only
shield nonimmigrant White populations from suspicion of gang involve-
ment, they also jeopardize the constitutional rights of racial minorities.
These points question whether the labeling of criminal street and prison
gangs for RICO purposes is a racially unbiased process.
A. Racial Stereotypes and Gang Conceptualizations
Cultural stereotypes influence how society constructs crime and
perceives criminal offenders. The word "mafia," for instance, engenders
particular images of Italian Americans that are perpetuated by the me-
dia.154 The well-known television show The Sopranos and popular movies
150. Street Gangs, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crininal/ocgs/
gangs/street.htnl (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
151. Id.
152. Id. These seventeen gangs are the 18th Street Gang, Almighty Latin King and
Queen Nation, Asian Boyz, Black Peace Stone Nation, Bloods, Crips, Florencia 13, Fresno
Bulldogs, Gangster Disciples, Latin Counts, Latin Disciples, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),
Surenos and Nortenos, Tango Blast, Tiny Rascal Gangsters, United Blood Nation, and
Vince Lord Nation.
153. About Violent Gangs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crilinal/
ocgs/gangs/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
154. JERRIE MANGIONE & BEN MORREALE, LA STORIA xvii (1993) ("The story of Ital-
ians and their American offspring must of course include the relatively few (nearly all of
them American-born) whose criminality encouraged Hollywood, ambitious politicians,
and the national media to exploit the dramatic nuances of the term "mafia," engendering a
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like The Godfather feed off of these cultural stereotypes that equate Italian
Americans with mobsters, buffoons, and hotheads.1 55
Similarly, American culture and media have disseminated damaging
stereotypes of racial minorities as gang members to such an extent that
perceptions of gangs and gang activity cannot be disassociated from these
racial stereotypes.' Latinos, for instance, have been consistently represent-
ed within American popular culture as "foreigners, outsiders, or
immigrants." '5 7 Perhaps the most common representation of Latino youth
in popular culture today is as a gang member. 58 Media and film coverage
of gangsta rap in the late 1980s and early 1990s also gave rise to the asso-
ciation between gang violence and racial minorities.19 Gangsta rap was an
important outlet for young artists to communicate their daily struggles
with racism and poverty.'" However, the explicit lyrics of gangsta rap and
the consumer demand for sensationalized racial violence 6 ' have popular-
ized stereotypes of racial minorities-especially young Black males-as
violent gangsters.16 2
stereotype that slanders the great majority of Italian Americans. This, too, is a feature of
Americanization.").
155. See, e.g., id.
156. See Howell, supra note 11, at 42.
157. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 204, 207 (Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2007).
158. Mary Romero, State Violence and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino Crimi-
nality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENV.U. L. REV. 1081, 1095 (2001). See also 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATINO POPULAR CULTURE 298 (Cordelia Candelaria et al. eds., 2004)
("One of the most common stereotypes of Latino youth in contemporary twenty-first-
century popular culture is that of gang members. Along with the conventional stereotypes
of the Latin lover from the early decades of motion pictures and of the Mexican maid
from the closing decades of the twentieth century, the sinister image of the gang member
in baggy pants, knotted head scarf, and tattoos has appeared regularly in movies and televi-
sion programming and contributed to general public perceptions of Latinos."); Lee, supra
note 157, at 207 ("The Latino-as-criminal stereotype often affects young male Latinos
who are assumed to be gang members, particularly if they live in a low-income high-
crime neighborhood and wear baggy pants and T-shirts.").
159. See GREG DiMTRIADIS, PERFORMING IDENTITY/PERFORMING CULTURE 99 (2009)
(discussing the representations of African American youth as "nihilistic" in media and film
spawned from the rise of gangsta rap).
160. See JOHN HAGEDORN, A WORLD OF GANGS: ARMED YOUNG MEN AND GANGSTA
CULTURE 97 (2008).
161. Lyddane, supra note 62, at 2 ("The news media and entertainment industry have
sensationalized gang crimes and the gang lifestyle to the point that it has become part of
mainstream America.").
162. See ANTHONY KWAME HARRISON, Hip HoP UNDERGROUND: THE INTEGRITY AND
ETHICS OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION 29 (2009) ("Music Industry rap flourished through the
proliferation of sensationalized images of black violent criminality, unbridled sexual potency,
and conspicuous consumption, in both content and style .... "); TORRIANO BERRY & VENISET.
BERRY, THE 50 MosT INFLUENTIAL BLACK FILMS: A CELEBRATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN TAL-
ENT, DETERMINATION, AND CREATIVITY 214 (2001) ("Rap music and the hip-hop culture
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Cultural stereotypes not only shape how the general public views
crime, but may also influence the perceptions and behaviors of police of-
ficers and prosecutors. Gang stereotypes within the police and
prosecutorial realms can have especially damaging consequences for racial
minorities. The harmful process begins at the level of law enforcement,
where racially slanted gang stereotypes can shape how police departments
perceive and report crimes. Gang stereotypes may drive some officers to
categorize crimes committed by groups of racial minorities as gang
crimes, even if the suspects have no ties to gangs or gang members. One
could hypothesize that police officers are more prone to make these erro-
neous assumptions when responding to crime within neighborhoods that
have predominantly racial minority populations and reputations of gang
activity. The harmful process may then continue to the prosecution stage,
where racial stereotypes of gang crime may shape prosecutors' decisions
to categorize certain groups of offenders as gangs and bring gang-related
charges, including RICO charges.164
The data suggest that gang stereotypes may disadvantage racial mi-
norities in two ways. First, gang stereotypes can reify the specific criminal
groups that law enforcement and prosecutors perceive as gangs. Put an-
other way, racially slanted gang stereotypes may bring specific gangs that
are commonly associated with racial minorities to the forefront of police
and prosecutors' radars. Within the sample, factions of the Bloods, the
Crips, MS-13, Latin Kings, and the Mexican Mafia were strongly repre-
sented.'66 These gangs are comprised of racial minorities and operate
mostly in neighborhoods with high racial minority populations.
raised concerns over violent and negative images of black men and women, as gangsta' and
gang-banger music videos filled the screens."); Bell Hooks, Misogyny, Gangsta Rap,
and the Piano, Z MAGAZINE (March 4, 1994, 7:50 AM), http://race.eserver.org/
isogynyhtmi (last visisted Apr. 1, 2012) ("[A] central motivation for highlighting gangsta
rap continues to be the sensationalist drama of demonizing Black youth culture in general
and the contributions of young Black men in particular."). Scholars have debated whether
these images perpetuated by rap music reflect the true lives of African Americans in poor
urban neighborhoods. See generally TRICIA ROSE, THE HiP Hop WARs: WAT WE TALK
ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT HIP HoP AND WHY IT MATTERS (2000) (outlining the con-
tending positions over whether rap music portrays negative images of African Americans
and accurately reflects life in poor black urban neighborhoods).
163. ALBERT R. ROBERTS, CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 35 (2nd ed. 2003)
("Unfortunately, the response of law enforcement officers (LEOs) to gang activity has not
been carefully planned. Rather, it has been for the most part dictated by economic needs,
media coverage, and the prevailing political atmosphere.").
164. Some scholars have criticized prosecutorial discretion as a factor underlying the
biased application of RICO. See Dombrink & Meeker, supra note 112, at 638-39.
165. Cf PICKERING, supra note 19, at 47 (stating that stereotypes can "operate as a
means of evaluatively placing, and attempting to fix in place, other people or cultures from
a particular and privileged perspective").
166. See "Finding 4," supra Part III.B.
338 [VOL. 17:303
Racial Bias and RICO's Application
One possible interpretation of this finding is that subsets of these
major gangs comprise a large proportion of gangs nationwide. This inter-
pretation would undermine the role of systemic racial bias in RICO gang
prosecutions. The dearth of reliable statistics on the quantity of gangs and
wide regional variability in gang activity make it impossible to determine
whether this is interpretation is correct. Another potential explanation is
that law enforcement and prosecutors may focus antigang efforts on these
notorious gangs as a consequence of the gang reification process de-
scribed in the previous paragraph. Public fear spawned by popularized
images of these major gangs by the media, such as in the television show
Gangland, creates an incentive for law enforcement to focus antigang ef-
forts on these major gangs in order to sustain or to improve law
enforcement's public image. As racial stereotypes drive the enforcement
practices of law enforcement and prosecutors, White criminal groups and
neighborhoods with predominantly nonimnigrant White populations are
shielded from being subjected to antigang operations.
Second, racially slanted gang stereotypes can disadvantage racial mi-
norities in RICO prosecution contexts by making police and prosecutors
more prone to assume that crimes committed by relatively small, unstruc-
tured groups of racial minorities are gang related. To demonstrate this
point more concretely, consider the following three cases:
On March 9, 2011, police officers arrested five White adults at a
North Carolina residence for running a methamphetamine lab.'6 7 The
officers found a .38 caliber revolver and drug paraphernalia at the resi-
dence. The five offenders were charged with various felonies, but not
labelled as a "gang" or charged under RICO for participating in the meth
ring.
In March 2010, officers arrested twelve White men who were in-
volved in an interstate theft and drug ring. 6" For months, the men stole
vehicles and prescription drugs from Florida and later sold stolen goods in
Alabama.The men were charged with multiple felonies for fraud and nar-
cotics offenses, but they were not labeled as a gang or charged under
RICO for running a gang enterprise.
In July 2002, five Black men from Dorchester, Massachusetts, were in-
dicted under RICO and charged with various felonies for violence and
narcotics."o The indictment alleged that the suspects were part of a criminal
167. Alison Hill, 5 Arrested in "Shake and Bake" Meth Lab, WBTB.com (Mar. 9, 2011,
11:54 AM), http://www.wbtv.com/story/14217641/5-arrested?redirected=true.
168. Lisa A. Davis, 12 Indicted in Interstate Theft, Drug Ring, THE PAsco TRIBUNE (Apr.
1, 2010), http://www2.tbo.com/content/2010/apr/01/12-indicted-interstate-theft-drug-
ring/.
169. See generally Indictment, United States v. Godwin (M.D. Fl. 2011) (No. 3:10-cr-
00276-MMH-TEM) (copy of indictment on file with author).
170. Maria Cramer & Brian R. Ballou, Suspect in 4 Killings was Acquitted on Racketeer-
ing Charges, BosToN GLOBE, December 9, 2010, at 1.
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street gang called the Esmond Street Crew, which aimed to sell crack co-
caine and marijuana. The indictment also alleged that the suspects
engaged in violent disputes with a rival neighboring gang.
All of the criminal groups in the cases above qualify as RICO en-
terprises and meet the federal statutory definition of criminal street
gang.1' But the only group that was deemed a criminal street gang and
charged under RICO was the sole group comprised of racial minorities.
In that case, there was strong disagreement over whether a criminal street
gang existed, which cast doubt on the appropriateness of the RICO
charge. The defendants alleged that there was no criminal enterprise and
that the government "inappropriately strung a series of acts committed at
different times, by different persons, for different motives, all to the detri-
ment of the defendants." 2 One defendant's attorney stated that "[n]obody
ever called them Esmond Street Crew until the federal government de-
cided that would be a nice thing to call them."'7 3 The lack of an existing
criminal enterprise was supported by prior findings by a trial judge in
United States v. Modlin, in which three of the same five defendants were
charged for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.17 4 In the sentencing hearing,
the judge concluded that the Esmond Street Crew was not a criminal
enterprise, but rather a group of people in the same locality who associat-
ed with one another and dealt drugs independently.7
Another RICO case in the sample demonstrates how easy it is for
the government to construct particular groups of racial minorities who
are involved in criminality as criminal street gangs for RICO purposes. In
2003, a federal grand jury returned RICO charges against nine men who
were part of an alleged gang called Pitch Dark Family ("PDF") inVallejo,
171. In the cases, the prosecution could have argued that each defendant was affiliat-
ed with or a member of a criminal group, that each defendant engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity through multiple acts of violence or drug crimes, and that each pred-
icate crime had a de minimis affect on interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006).
Moreover, in the cases above, the prosecution could have argued that each group was
comprised of five or more members, that each group had the commission of criminal
offenses as one of its primary purposes, that those offenses were comnitted within the past
five years, and that each of those activities affect interstate or foreign commerce. See 18
U.S.C. § 521(a) (2002).
172. See Memorandum and Order Re: Severance/Bifurcation of Guilt and Punish-
ment at 2-3, United States v. Green, No. 02-10301-NG (D. Mass. July 7, 2004) (copy of
memorandum on file with author).
173. David S. Bernstein, Fedz in the 'Hood, June 25 - July 1, 2004 THE PORTLAND
PHOENIx 2 (2004), available at http://www.portlandphoeix.com/features/other-stories/
multi2/documents/03938891.asp (quoting Benjamin Entine).
174. Judgment, United States v. Modlin, CR01-10314 (D. Mass. May 21, 2003) (copy
ofjudgment on file with author).
175. Clerk's Notes, United States v. Heinrich (D. Mass 2003) (copy of notes for sen-
tencing hearing on file with author).
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California.'7 6 Members of the group also wrote and performed rap music
under the same name.'7 7 One of the most contested issues at trial was
whether PDF was a criminal enterprise or a rap group that happened to
contain some members involved in criminality."
The government used two sources to establish that PDF was a street
gang. First, it relied upon the testimony of a number of witnesses, each of
whom had criminal histories and were testifying in return for leniency in
a pending case.' 79 Second, the government relied upon expert testimony
from a previous gang intelligence officer of the Vallejo Police Department.
The former officer testified that PDF was a street gang based on "street
knowledge" that he purportedly gained from working the graveyard shift
for multiple years.so The former officer did not write down a single piece
of information prior to trial and could not remember the name of a sin-
gle source from which he gained his street knowledge."' He defined a
street gang as "three or more people who were bound together by some
social need and who were involved in committing criminal acts that gen-
erally put safety of the citizenry at risk." 82 The former officer testified that
the Pitch Dark Family met this definition based on his street knowledge
and from a few articles of clothing with PDF logos, a piece of graffiti that
displayed the nicknames of PDF members, and a letter that referred to the
1813
PDF as an entity.
The defense argued unsuccessfully that PDF was not a criminal
street gang, but rather a group of rappers who were close friends and
grew up together.184 The defense conceded that some of the members sold
drugs for profit, but maintained that these criminal acts had nothing to do
with the group itself.'" The defense called attention to the fact that the
government's own witnesses admitted that each defendant who sold drugs
kept his own profits and did not contribute any of those profits to the
PDF as an organization.' 6 There was no evidence of existing organiza-
tional rules or a defined structure. Moreover, the gang was not listed
within the California gang database and police officers did not refer to
176. Charlie Goodyear, 9 Arrested on Gang Charges; 8 Suspected in Vallejo Slayings, SAN
FRANcIsco CHRONICLE, Feb. 22, 2003, at A15 (copy of indictment on file with author).
177. Brief of Appellants, United States v. Walker, Nos. 06-10643, 06-10653 (Ninth
Cir.July 7, 2008), 2008 WL 3285593, at *2.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., id. at *13 n.3.
180. Id. at *49. See also id. at *6-*9.
181. Id. at *8-*9.
182. Id. at *7.
183. Id. at *9-*10.
184. Id. at *34.
185. Id.
186. See id. at *14.
187. See id.
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the criminal group as "Pitch Dark Family" or "PDF" within any of the
recorded documentation after arresting the defendants.'18
Another case from the sample that shows how easy it is for the gov-
ernment to construct groups of racial minority offenders as gangs for
RICO purposes involves the alleged gang called "Chain Gang" or "Wolf
Pack." In that case, twenty-four members of the alleged criminal street
gang were indicted under RICO for a variety of crimes in the Rochester
area, including violence and the sale of crack cocaine. 89 The defendants
argued that there was no such organization called the Chain Gang or the
Wolf Pack.190 After the defendants were arrested on RICO charges, local
community activists held a neighborhood meeting to garner support for
the arrestees and challenge the basis of the racketeering charges.' 9 ' One of
the arrestees, who worked as a cook for the University of Rochester, did
not deny her criminal transgressions, but stated: "We are not an organiza-
tion, we did not organize anything.We are friends who have known each
other for years." 92 The arrestee's mother, Gwendolyn, told the media that
the name "Wolf Pack" was a "pet-name" that she had given to a group of
neighborhood kids that she used to cook for because they were going
hungry.'" One day, Gwendolyn's son said to her, "Momma, those kids are
hanging around like a pack of wolves, waiting to eat."'94 When Gwendo-
lyn finished cooking, she said to her son, "Call in the wolf pack."' 9 From
that day on, a relationship grew between her family and the neighbor-
hood youth, and she continued to fondly call them the "Wolf Pack."196
In addition to the Esmond Street Crew, the Pitch Dark Family, and
'97
the Chain Gang/Wolf Pack cases, there were thirty-nine other cases in
the sample involving relatively small and local criminal groups that the
government chose to prosecute as criminal street gangs. One interpetation
of this finding is that the term "gang" has taken on a racialized meaning,
independent of its formal definition under the law, which increases the
likelihood that crimes committed by small groups of racial minorities will
be labeled as gang-related crimes. In fairness, the government is not the
188. Id. at *3-*4.
189. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Authorities Target City Gang Under
Federal RICO Statute (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://www.atfgov/press/releases/
2009/04/042809-ny-authorities-target-city-gang.html.
190. Dave McCleary, Members of the So-Salled "Wolf Pack" Gang Proclaiming Innocence,








197. See Table 5, supra Part III.B.
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only player involved in this labeling process: in some cases, racial minori-
ties may internalize gang stereotypes and identify as gang members when
they are involved in criminal groups that are comprised mostly of racial
minorities.19 8 Regardless, the Esmond Street Crew, the Pitch Dark Family,
and the Chain Gang/Wolf Pack cases show that law enforcement and
prosecutors are sometimes the primary players in this labeling process, and
that racial stereotypes enable these players to use race as a proxy in order
to construct crime, perhaps erroneously, as gang-related. The low burden
of proof that the government must meet to establish a RICO criminal
enterprise facilitates these racially biased constructions of group criminali-
ty. The incredible difficulty of raising a successful selective prosecution
claim under the U.S. Constitution makes it even more difficult to chal-
lenge these racially biased constructions of gang crime.'99
The study findings involving the way in which RICO is being
applied to White-affiliated gangs further supports the notion that racially
slanted assumptions guide the government's construction of gang
phenomena. As stated previously in Part III.B, the sample of RICO
prosecutions against White-affiliated gangs generally fell into three
categories: motorcycle outlaw gangs, White supremacist prison gangs, and
international organized crime groups. Only one case in the sample, which
will be discussed later, fell outside of these categories.200
198. In making this argument, I am utilizing concepts from "labeling theory" devel-
oped by Howard Becker in his popular work OUTSIDERs: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE (1963). Becker viewed deviance as a social creation, not an objective phenome-
non. Id. at 8. In his view, people suffered a drastic change in their public identities as a
consequence of being labeled as deviant. People assumed a "master status" of the deviant,
emaning that deviancy became the main feature of their identities. Id. at 32. Becker con-
tended that because people's self-conceptions depend on the recognition of others,
individuals who were labeled as deviant begin to identify and act in accordance with their
master status. Id. at 34. As individuals became marginalized from conventional society, they
increased their involvement in organized groups comprised of others who were similarly
labeled as deviant. Id. at 37-38. Deviant subcultures affirmed the identities of deviant
members, and rationalized and justified the activities of their members. Id. at 39.
199. See Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-On-Guns Program
Targets Minority Conununities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 319
(2007) ("Selective prosecution claims are very difficult to prove, as there is rarely proof that
a prosecutor sought prosecution because of a defendant's race. Moreover, the tests for
proving discriminatory impact and purpose are applied under a strenuous standard of re-
view. Prosecutors have broad discretion in making charging decisions and those decisions
are rarely disturbed."). In making this point, I am not discounting the possibility of raising
a federal equal protection violation. In fact, scholars have argued that state RICO laws
violate state equal protection guarantees. See Janice A. Petrella, Equal Protection - What is in
a Name? Sign? Symbol? Gang Members and RICO Considered, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1237 (2003).
200. See Indictment, United States v. Godwin, supra note 169. In Godwin, six individ-
uals were indicted for allegedly being part of a criminal street gang called "the Guardians."
Id. at T 1.The alleged gang committed violent home invasions, armed bank robberies, and
dealt cocaine and prescription drugs. Id. at 2. See also Dana Treen, Feds:Jacksonville Cang
Traded in Violence, Intimidation, Drugs, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (Apr. 11, 2011, 5:12 PM),
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One important feature of this categorization scheme is that it in-
cludes White-affiliated criminal groups that are isolated and marginalized
from mainstream nonimmigrant White communities. This characteristic
differs fundamentally from the prosecuted racial minority gangs, which
often have strong central presences in neighborhoods populated predomi-
nantly by racial minorities. For instance, members of motorcycle outlaw
gangs and White supremacist prison gangs fit visual prototypes that distin-
guish them from mainstream White communities. Motorcycle outlaw
gang members often ride motorcycles, wear vests adorned with club-
201
specific patches, and have club tattoos. White supremacist prison gang
members are often tattooed heavily with symbols (such as swastikas and
202lightning bolts) that signify White racial superiority. These criminal
groups are also distanced from nonimmigrant White communities based
on their ideologies. Motorcycle outlaw gangs were initially ostracized
from mainstream motorcycle cultures, and later deliberately assumed
203
identities as social outcasts. American society has marginalized White
supremacist views as "extreme" and "radical," which could be interpreted
as an attempt for American society to distance itself from its history of
204
institutionalized racial subordination through slavery and segregation.
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2011-04-20/story/feds-jacksonville-gang-traded-
violence-intimidation-drugs.
201. LYMAN & POTTER, supra note 98, at 282-83 ("Outlaw motorcycle gangs have
become easily identifiable because of their colors or membership jacket.... In addition ...
his motorcycle is a great source of pride and significance."); PATRICK MORLEY, REPORT
WRITING FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 196 (2008) ("A motorcycle gang member
will not attempt to hide his club membership .... There will be obvious gang or club
markings, club symbols and patches, belt buckles, as well as a club tattoo, if he has been in
the club or gang for a period of time.").
202. See T.J. LEYDEN & M. BRIDGET COOK, SKINHEAD CONFESSIONS: FROM HATE TO
HOPE 47-48 (2008) (describing the swastika and lightning bolt tattoos as conunon symbols
of white power and racism). For a database of extremist symbols and their meanings, see A
Visual Database of Extremist Symbols, Logos, and Tattoos, AMERICAN DEFAMATION LEAGUE
(2005), http://www.adl.org/hate-symbols/default-graphics.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
203. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & ROBERT F MEIER, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 14
(14th ed. 2011) ("These bikers live hedonistic lives and often reinforce their image of them-
selves as social outcasts by engaging in outrageous behavior for the benefit of onlookers.");
STEPHEN SCHNEIDER, ICED: THE STORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CANADA 379-80 (2009)
("Revelling in their image as social outcasts, rebel bikers adopted the 'one-percenter' moni-
ker to distinguish themselves from the majority of motorcycle riders and, eventually, the rest
of society. This label would signal the start of a concerted effort by 'outlaw bikers' to culti-
vate a lifestyle and image that would give rise to a subculture dedicated to challenging the
accepted norms and values of mainstream American society.").
204. Charles W Mills, White Supremacy, in 269 A COMPANION TO AemicAN-AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY (Tommy L. Lott & John P Pittman eds., 2006) ("Since official segregation and
political exclusion of this sort no longer exist in the United States, the term ["White su-
premacy"] has now disappeared from mainstream white American discourse, except to
refer to the unhappy past or, in the purely ideological sense, to the beliefs of radical white
separatist groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations).").
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White supremacist prison gangs are further separated from mainstream
society because they operate mostly inside the prison walls.205
Language from some of the RICO indictments in the sample illus-
trates how the government is using concepts of ethnicity in order to
distance the third category of White-affiliated gangs-international orga-
nized crime groups-from nonimmigrant White communities. In 2010,
for instance, a federal grand jury indicted seventy members of Armenian
Power, a Los Angeles gang comprised mostly of individuals of Armenian
descent. Since the beginning of the Twentieth Century, U.S. courts have
treated Armenians as "White" under the law.20 Despite this fact, the
RICO indictment does not once describe Armenian Power or its mem-
bers as White. Conversely, the indictment labels the gang as an ethnic
street gang.207 The indictment emphasizes the gang's non-American ties,
describing it as an "international organized crime group" 208 consisting
"primarily of individuals of Armenian descent, as well as of other coun-
tries within the former Soviet bloc."209 The gang members' preferences for
speaking in Russian and Armenian are discussed which, it is stated, further
distances the gang from mainstream English-speaking society.2" These
statements indicate that the government did not view Armenian Power as
a group of criminally involved White Americans.
The study findings therefore suggest that the White-affiliated gangs
being prosecuted under RICO fit a very narrow prototype that does not
apply to many criminal groups comprised of nonimmigrant White offend-
ers. This categorization scheme privileges mainstream nonimmigrant White
criminal offenders from being stigmatized as gang members by reifying al-
ready marginalized White-affiliated groups (outlaw motorcycle gangs,
White supremacist prison gangs, and international organized crime groups)
as "gangs." Furthermore, the government may rely upon this categorization
205. A Life of Service: An Interview with Mia Yamamoto, 13 AsiAN PAc. AM. L.J. 1, 8
(2007) ("[A] prison gang and prison gangs are organized, in many ways, around the same
societal dynamic that creates minority groups on the outside, which is their exclusion
from the mainstrearfi of, in that case, prison society .... ").
206. See e.g., In re Halladjian, 174 F 834 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) (describing an Armeni-
an born in Asiatic Turkey as a "free white-person" within the meaning of federal law and
thus eligible for naturalization).
207. Grand Jury Indictment at 11, United States v. Darbinyan, No. CR-11-0072
(C.D. Cal.Jan. 26, 2011)("Armenian Power was formed in the East Hollywood district of
Los Angeles as a street gang whose membership consisted primarily of individuals of Ar-
menian descent, as well as of other countries within the former Soviet bloc, in response to
other ethnic street gangs in the area.").
208. Id. at 10.
209. Id. at 11.
210. Id. at 15 ("Particularly through its leadership, Armenian Power maintains ties to
Russia and Armenia, to which most members and associates generally retain strong ethnic
and cultural ties. Indeed, although most are fluent in English, Armenian Power members
and associates generally prefer to discuss their criminal activities in the Armenian and
Russian languages in order to conceal their discussions to the extent possible.").
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scheme to generate statistics that create a perception that the government
recognizes and takes the problem ofWhite gang crime seriously. This per-
ception may be distorted, and even false, if the government does not label
White criminal groups as gangs simply because those groups fall outside
of this narrow prototype.
The privilege provided by this categorization scheme to mainstream
nonimmigrant White communities is not necessarily beneficial; it may
even be harmful. The single case that fell outside of the categorization
scheme demonstrates that White gang problems can pose serious dangers
to communities, including nonimmigrant White neighborhoods. The case
involved a group of six males that called themselves "The Guardians."21t
Prior to being indicted under RICO, the gang committed a number of
violent crimes in Florida, including brutal home invasions and armed
212bank robberies, and also dealt prescription drugs, steroids, and cocaine.
The gang targeted "high dollar" homes to steal jewelry, firearms, and cred-
it cards. 213 In committing these crimes, gang members pistol-whipped and
tied up their victims. One victim was so severely injured that he suffered a
skull fracture and spent several days on life support.2 14 If the government
had not conceptualized the group as a gang, then the government would
have been unable to execute gang-specific interventions to curb the crim-
inal group's violent activity.
Criminological research suggests that the RICO white-gang proto-
type is underinclusive ofWhite gang phenomena. As explained previously,
Esbensen and Winfree's comprehensive multisite study found that contra-
ry to popular perception, one in four gang members identified as White.215
The subjects of the study were eighth-grade students. Since motorcycle
gangs have adult members, one can infer that the White gang members in
the study were not part of motorcycle gangs. Moreover, Esbensen and
Winfree deliberately categorized the ethnicity of gang members as "Oth-
216er" if they identified as Italian, German, Portuguese, etc. As a result, the
gang members that were categorized as White were not part of interna-
tional organized crime groups. The only category left is White
supremacist prison gangs. Since the students were not incarcerated, they
also do not fit this prototype. There is no mention by the investigators
that all of the White gang members in the study were part of White su-
premacist gangs. One could surmise, however, that the investigators would
have explicitly mentioned such a strong finding if this were the case. Thus,
211. Dana Treen, Feds:Jacksonville Gang Traded in Violence, Intimidation, Drugs,JACKSON-





215. Esbensen &Winfree, supra note 21, at 517.
216. Id.
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in reifying "White gang problems" as involving international organized
crime groups, motorcycle outlaw gangs, and White supremacist prison
gangs, the categorization scheme provides a framework to rationalize gov-
ernmental neglect of White gang problems, especially in nommingrant
White communities. In facilitating this neglect, the limited prototype pre-
vents law enforcement and community advocacy groups from executing
interventions to combat White gang crime.
B. The Convergence of Immigration and Gang Enforcement
As argued previously, the motivation to dismantle the Mafia through
RICO was at least partially rooted in discriminatory conceptions of mi-
grant criminality involving Italian and Sicilian immigrants. History seems
to be repeating itself in the context of RICO's application to street and
prison gangs. Although immigrant-based gangs are not a new phenome-
non,217 recent perceptions of criminality involving migrants and
immigrants from Mexico, Central America, and South America have
spawned a new term: the "transnational gang."218 Based on stereotypes that
label migrants and immigrants as criminals, these concerns are influenced
by a strong wave of anti-immigrant sentiment over the past two dec-
ades.219
New fears of migrant criminality have inspired a troublesome
partnership between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) called Operation
Community Shield (OCS).220 Created in February, 2005, OCS combines
the resources of ICE and law enforcement agencies in order to combat
217. JESSICA M.VAUGHAN & JOHN D. FEERE, CENTER OF IMMIGRATION STUDIES,TAKING
BACK THE STREETS: ICE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TARGET IMMIGRANT GANGs 3
(2008), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2008/back1208.pdf See also, NATIONAL
DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, ATTORNEY GEN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE GROWTH OF
VIOLENT STREET GANGS IN SUBURBAN AREAS (April 2008), available at http://
www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs27/27612/dept.htm (quoting that the Department of Justice
"has significantly expanded efforts to attack the links that connect transnational gang
members across the region, especially in Mexico and Central America").
218. See supra note 31.
219. See Jennifer M. Chacon, Whose Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the
"Criminal Street Cang" Member, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F 317, 321 (2007)[hereinafter Chacon,
Whose Community Shield?] ("Almost two decades ago, Congress made important changes
to federal immigration law by expanding the number of offenses that would render a
noncitizen eligible for removal."); id. at 324 ("With the rapidly increasing size of the
immigrant population-which coincided with the increasing criminalization of that pop-
ulation-came a public outcry against the perceived dangers of 'criminal aliens.'").
220. See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 32, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan
Burton, Chairman, Subcomm.W Hemisphere).
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criminal street gang violence and illegal immigration. 221 OCS was originally
designed to target members and affiliates of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),
222
which is comprised mostly of individuals of El Salvadorian descent. Three
months after OCS began, ICE expanded the program's scope to include
223
all alleged transnational street gang members and their affiliates.
Since its inception, OCS has been used to conduct sweeping arrests
of alleged street gang members. In March 2011, for instance, OCS arrest-
ed 678 alleged gang members and affiliates from 133 Mexican-affiliated
gangs during a single initiative called Project Southern Tempest.224 OCS
operations have already resulted in almost 24,000 arrests for crimes and
imnigration violations. 225 Based on available evidence, one can infer that
most of the operations involved individuals from Mexico, Central and
226
South America, and the Caribbean. RICO is one tool that empowers
law and immigration enforcement to conduct sweeping arrests of alleged
gang members and affiliates during OCS operations. On October 16,
2008, for example, an ICE-led investigation resulted in a fifty-one-count
indictment against thirty-one members of MS-13, of which nineteen
faced charges under federal RICO for violent crimes.227
Since illegal immigration in the United States is a phenomenon that
is closely associated with racial minorities (especially Latinos), non-White
221. See News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 321 Arrested in
ICE-Led Multi-Agency Operation Targeting Gang Members (Aug. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0808/080807miami.htm.
222. HERBERT C. COVEY, STREET GANGS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 64 (2010) ("Pre-
dominantly El Salvadorian, the MS-13 early membership is reported to be from
Salvadorian soldiers escaping the civil war who brought combat experience with them to
Los Angeles"). Chacon argues that MS-13 formed after El Salvadorian soldiers brought
back U.S. gang culture to El Salvador after being deported from the United States. Cha-
con, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 219, at 327-29. In her view, "MS-13 is more a
U.S. phenomenon than a Central American Import." Id. at 329.
223. See Operation Community Shield/Transnational Gangs, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/community-shield/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2012).
224. See News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 679 Gang
members and Associates Arrested During Project Southern Tempest: ICE Makes Arrest of
20,000th Gang Member (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/
1103/110301washingtondc.htm.
225. See supra note 174. According to ICE, 12,100 of these arrests involved crimes
and 11,700 of these arrests involved administrative immigration offenses. Id.
226. Vaughan and Feere, for instance, compiled data of the nationality of OCS ar-
restees between 2005 and 2007.The data comprised 6,559 arrests from fifty-three different
nationalities. Of the arrestees, 59% were from Mexico, 17% El Salvador, 9% United States,
5% Honduras, 3% Guatemala, 1% Jamaica, 2% Unknown, and 4% Other. See VAUGHAN &
FEERE, supra note 217, at 3.
227. See Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law: Hearing Before the H. Appropriations Comm,
Subcomm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Marcy M. Foreman, Dir.,
Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement), available at
www.ice.gov/docib/news/library/speeches/forman_0402_09.doc.
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populations are overwhelmingly targeted by OCS operations. 228 The prac-
tice of combining immigration and antigang law enforcement resources
into partnerships such as OCS shields gangs without transnational ties,
such as White gangs in nonmmigrant White neighborhoods, from being
targeted by those partnerships. Consequently, when RICO is used as a
tool to prosecute the targets of OCS operations, it is highly likely that the
federal statute will be applied to prosecute racial minorities.
Another very disturbing aspect of OCS operations is that law and
immigration enforcement officers are using vague and subjective standards
during these operations to distinguish gang members/affiliates from crim-
inals who are not affiliated with gangs, and gang members/affiliates from
innocent people.2 29 The dangers that these lax standards pose to racial mi-
norities are exacerbated by the recent merging of the civil and criminal
immigration frameworks within the United States. 23 0 Federal criminal
procedure affords a variety of protections to citizen defendants that are
not available to non-citizens.2 31 Since ICE is permitted to use racial iden-
tity as a proxy in order to distinguish between noncitizens and citizens (a
distinction that is not entirely clear itself),232 OCS enables law enforce-
ment to circumvent criminal procedural protections by relying upon state
and local officials to use their discretion to investigate alleged gang mem-
bers and affiliates.233 The discretion of state and local officials is not
234
constrained by the substantive protections of the criminal law As a result,
law enforcement and ICE may target non-criminally involved racial minor-
ities for immigration violations under the pretext that these individuals are
228. See supra note 226.
229. See Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Workers Caught in a Net Cast for Gangs, N.Y TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2007, at 41 ("The [Operation Community Shield] crackdown relies heavily on
local police forces to identify suspects, often based on loosely defined or subjective crite-
ria."); Jennifer M. Chacon, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1593 (2010) [hereinafter Cha-
con, A Diversion] ("One of the biggest ambiguities about the operation [Operation
Conimnunity Shield] is that it provides no legal definitions for 'criminal street gangs' or
'associates,' the targets of that operation.").
230. See generally, Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281
(2010) (discussing the increasing intergation of civil and criminal immigration enforce-
ment).
231. Devon W Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Immigration, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1543, 1545 (2011) (noting that "citizenship affords a set of procedural and constitu-
tional protections in immigration and criminal law enforcement contexts that are
unavailable to noncitizens").
232. See id. at 1545-46 ("In the context of contemporary immigration enforcement,
with respect to Latinos, this proxy function of race blurs the boundary between citizen
and noncitizen and further conflates noncitizenship and undocumented status.").
233. Chacon, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 219, at 332.
234. Id.
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alleged transnational gang members or affiliates.235 This risk seems to be
borne out in reality, given that a majority of the deportations resulting
from OCS operations have been based on immigration violations rather
than criminal charges.236
Cases have already surfaced that illustrate how these partnerships be-
tween law and immigration enforcement are operating as legitimized
forms of racial profiling. In September 2007, an operation under OCS in
Greenport, New York, resulted in the arrests of eleven alleged gang mem-
bers.237 Only one of the arrested men had any suspected gang ties. 238 The
other ten men, while accused of immigration violations, had no criminal
history and were not gang members.239 Many of those men had reputa-
tions within their communities as family men and good workers. 240 The
mayor denounced the operation, characterizing the "gang issue [as a
means of keeping] the White majority scared about the Latino population
... [allowing ICE] to come in and bust as many people as they want."241
Another lawsuit brought recently against the County of Sonoma,
California, further illustrates how law and immigration enforcement part-
nerships are enabling officers to use gangs as a pretext to target racial
242
minorities. The lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of a joint opera-
tion between ICE and the Sonoma County sheriff's antigang unit on the
grounds that the operation was racially discriminatory.243 The plaintiffs
argued that law enforcement officers entered neighborhoods with high
Latino populations with the alleged goal of targeting undocumented
alien gang members. 24 4 The plaintiffs alleged that they were contacted,
235. Chacon, A Diversion, supra note 229, at 1593-94 ("The lack of legal standards
governing the identification of gang members creates a risk of increased racial profiling in
law enforcement."); Abby Sullivan, Note, On Thin Ice: Cracking Doun on the Racial Profiling
of Immigrants and Implementing a Compassionate Enforcement Policy, 6 HASTINGS RACE & Pov-
ERTY L.J. 101, 120-21 (2009) ("Because imnuigration agents are permitted to consider race
more liberally than typical law enforcement officers, this blurring of the line between
crime control and immigration law enforcement has created an immigration enforcement
policy under which the permissibility of the use of race is increasingly vague.").
236. Sullivan, supra note 235, at 121 ("Operation Community Shield creates a loop-
hole under which local law enforcement effectively targets immigrants who have no
criminal history and pose no threat to the community .... [Tihe government has deport-
ed seventy percent of those removed under Operation Community Shield based on
immigration violations alone, without bringing criminal charges.").
237. Id. at 122.
238. Bernstein, supra note 229, at 41.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (brackets in original).
242. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Comm. for
Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08-
4220) (copy of Complaint on file with author).
243. Id. at 6.
244. Id.
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questioned, searched, detained, and arrested, even though there was no
reasonable suspicion that they were illegal immigrants or gang members
or were engaging in criminal activity.
One plaintiff, for instance, was pulled over while riding in a car with
other Latino occupants.245 The car displayed a "For Sale" sign in the back
window.246 The driver was not cited for a traffic infraction, yet the police
interrogated him about his gang affiliations.24 7 The officer then asked the
plaintiff whether he was on probation and whether he had any gang af-
filations. 24 8 The plaintiff admitted that he was on probation. Although the
police had no reasonable suspicion of civil or criminal violations, the
plaintiff was forced out of the car, interrogated about his gang affilations,
searched, arrested, and detained solely for his "suspected imnigration sta-
t S,,249tus.24
Another plaintiff and his fianc6e were entering a bakery to purchase
a cake when they were stopped by two sheriffs, supposedly because of a
crack in the car's windshield. 25 0 The sheriffs then questioned the plaintiff
about his immigration status, his tattoos, and whether he was a gang
member.251 The sheriffs also unlawfully searched his wallet.25 2 The plaintiff
responded that he was not a gang member, but he refused to answer ques-
tions about his immigration status.2 5 The following month, officers
arrested the plaintiff at his job based on his suspected imnuigration sta-
tus.254 The sheriffs had no reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff was a
noncitizen without authorization to be in the United States. 255 The plain-
tiff had no prior police record other than for driving without a license,
and he had never been a gang member.256
The case against the County of Sonoma was eventually settled, so
the constitutionality of the joint operation was not litgated.257 The plain-
tiffs' allegations, however, suggest that race is being used as an illegitimate
proxy for criminality and that transnational gang membership is being
used as a pretext to target innocent racial minorities, especially Latinos. In
legitimizing the use of racial profiling, these operations jeopardize the
245. Id. at 10.
246. Id. at 10-11.
247. Id. at 11.
248. Id.
249. Id.







257. Settlement Agreement and General Release of Claims, County of Sonoia (ND.
Cal. 2008) (copy of Settlement Agreement on file with author).
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individual rights and procedural protections of racial minorities and put
them at risk of being presumed undocumented noncitizens and/or crim-
inals.
CONCLUSION
In summary, this Article's presentation of new empirical data casts
doubt over whether the application of RICO to prosecute gangs is a ra-
cially unbiased process. The limitations of the study method indicate a
serious need for government agencies, especially the FBI and the De-
partment of Justice, to distribute annual data on the racial demographics
of the gangs prosecuted under RICO. In articulating potential biases that
may drive RICO gang prosecutions, I recommend for law enforcement
and prosecutors to be more transparent when deciding to label (and not
to label) particular criminal groups as gangs. I further urge law enforce-
ment and prosecutors to think more critically, reflectively, and carefully
about the terms by which they construct crime as gang-related. As the
Article has illustrated, the illegitimate use of race as a proxy to construct,
and then to prosecute, gang-related crime has destructive consequences
for all races, but especially for racial minorities. Clear and enforceable
standards must be put into place in order to inhibit the government from
using gang prevention as a pretext to engage in invidious practices of ra-
cial profiling that erroneously label innocent racial minorities, and racial
minority criminal offenders without gang ties, as gang members. Given
the harsh consequences of RICO convictions, these new strategies are
essential to prevent RICO from operating as a state instrument of racial
subordination.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Key:








(10) = International Organized Crime Group
(OMG) = Outlaw Motorcycle Gang
(WSPG) = White Supremacist Prison Gang
RICO GANG PROSECUTIONs 2001-2011
No. Year State Gang Name Primary Racial No. Indicted Under
Affiliation of Gang RICO RICO
1 2011 NY Bronx Trinitarios Gang L 41
(BTG)
2 2011 TX Texas Syndicate L 17
3 2011 MD Dead Man Incorporated W (WSPG) 22
4 2011 DC MS-13 L 6
5 2011 IN Imperial Gangsters L 11
6 2011 IN Almighty Latin King and L 18
Queen Nation (ALKQN)
7 2011 TX Texas Mexican Mafia L 15
8 2011 NC Almighty Latin King and L 13
Queen Nation (ALKON)
9 2011 TX Texas Syndicate L 11
10 2011 MD Southside Brims Bloods B 27
11 2011 NY Newburgh Bloods B 15
12 2011 NY Courtlandt Avenue Crew B 9
13 2011 TX MS-13 L 7
14 2011 MO Wheels of Soul M (OMG) 18
15 2011 CA Forming Kaos L 17
16 2011 CA Mexican Mafia L 28
17 2011 GA Vatos Locos L 6
18 2011 TX Barrio Azteca L 5
19 2011 NY 1Oth Street Gang M (B & L) 29
20 2011 NY Four Block Gang B 19
21 2011 FL The Guardians W 6
22 2011 CA Crips B 38
23 2011 NY Bricktown Gang B 13
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No. Year State Gang Name Primary Racial No. Indicted Under
Affiliation of Gang RICO RICO
24 2011 VA Bounty Hunter Bloods/Nine B 8
Tech Gangsters
25 2011 ID Brown Magic Clica L 11
26 2011 TX Barrio Azteca L 35
27 2011 OH LSP Gang B 23
28 2011 CA Azusa 13 L 27
29 2011 DC MS-13 L 11
30 2011 NY Almighty Latin King and L 17
Queen Nation (ALKQN)
31 2011 CA 38th Street Gang L 50
32 2011 TN Bloods B 6
33 2011 CA Lennox 13 L 6
34 2011 NJ Fruit Town/Brick City Brims B 15
35 2010 TX Raza Unida L 13
36 2010 MD 18th Street Gang L 7
37 2010 NY Pagan's W (OMG) 13
38 2010 PA Harlem Boys B 14
39 2010 NY Bugout BoyzlNine-Trey B 12
Gangsters
40 2010 LA Josephine Dog Pound B 8
41 2010 TX Bounty Hunter Bloods/Nine B 6
Tech Gangsters
42 2010 TX Aryan Brotherhood W (WSPG) 3
43 2010 VA Outlaws W (OMG) 27
44 2010 CA Armenian Power W (10) 70
45 2010 MD Black Guerrilla Family B 14
46 2010 UT Tongan Crips A 9
47 2010 PA Almighty Latin King and L 12
Queen Nation (ALKQN)
48 2010 GA MS-13 L 26
49 2010 CA Puente 13 L 16
50 2010 CA Pueblo Bishop Bloods B 41
51 2010 PA Brighton Place/Northview B 26
Heights Crips
52 2010 VA Outlaws W (OMG) 23
53 2009 MD Almighty Latin King and L 19
Queen Nation (ALKON)
54 2009 CA The Avenues L 88
55 2009 CA Eastside Gang L 19
56 2009 CA Black Angels L 37
57 2009 NY Original Gangsta Killers B 23
(OGK)
58 2009 TN Almighty Vice Lord Nation B 9
59 2009 WV Pagan's W (OMG) 5
60 2009 TX Texas Mexican Mafia L 12
61 2009 NY 110 Gang B 12
354 [VOL. 17:303
Racial Bias and RICO's Application
No. Year State Gang Name Primary Racial No. Indicted Under
Affiliation of Gang RICO RICO
62 2009 MI Highwaymen Motorcycle W (OMG) 74
Club
63 2009 CA Varrio Hawaiian Gardens L 57
Gang
64 2009 CA MS-13 L 24
65 2009 MD Pasadena Denver Lane B 23
(PDL) Bloods
66 2009 MD Black Guerrilla Family B 14
67 2009 VA Dump Squad B 10
68 2009 NY Newburgh Crew B 4
69 2008 CA Mongols M (OMG) 79
70 2008 CA MS-13 L 22
71 2008 NV Playboy Bloods B 10
72 2008 IL Almighty Latin King and L 15
Queen Nation (ALKON)
73 2008 NY MS-13 L 8
74 2008 DC 662 Boss Piru B 8
75 2008 NC MS-13 L 26
76 2008 NV Aryan Warriors W (WSPG) 13
77 2008 TN Tree Top Piru (TTP) B 26
78 2008 NY Chain Gang/Wolf Pack B 24
79 2008 CA Drew Street Gang L 51
80 2008 TX Texas Mexican Mafia L 23
81 2008 FL Neighborhood Piru Bloods B 14
82 2007 CA Florencia 13 L 104
83 2008 NV Squad Up B 3
84 2007 TX Texas Syndicate L 17
85 2007 KS Crips B 20
86 2007 KS Crips B 8
87 2007 KS Crips B 13
88 2007 Ml Outlaws W (OMG) 16
89 2007 CA Columbia Lil' Cycos L 27
90 2007 MD MS-13 L 16
91 2007 TX Texas Syndicate L 12
92 2007 TN MS-13 L 14
93 2007 TX Texas Syndicate L 14
94 2006 NY Pagan's W (OMG) 55
95 2006 NY Jungle Junkies B 25
96 2006 CA 18th Street Gang L 11
97 2006 NY Brighton Brigade B 14
98 2006 CA Mexican Mafia L 22
99 2006 UT Tiny Oriental Posse A 14
100 2006 WA Hells Angels W (OMG) 5
101 2005 WI Almighty Latin King and L 49
Queen Nation (ALKON)
102 2005 GA Unnamed M (B&L) 27
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No. Year State Gang Name Primary Racial No. Indicted Under
Affiliation of Gang RICO RICO
103 2005 MD MS-13 L 19
104 2005 GA Sur-13 L 13
105 2005 NY Elk Block Gang B 16
106 2005 NY Cash Money Brothers B 13
107 2005 CA West Myrtle Street Gang L 11
108 2005 CA Ojeda Organization L 16
109 2005 CA Down Below Gang B 5
110 2005 OK Hoover Crips B 13
111 2005 CA Page Street Mob B 5
112 2005 NY Yi Ging Organization A 18
113 2005 NY Six Tre Outlaw Gangsta B 7
Disciples Folk Nation
114 2005 IL Chicago Outfit W (10) 14
115 2005 IL Insane Deuces M (B&L) 16
116 2005 NY Freeman Street Robbery L 11
Organization
117 2005 NY McGriff Enterprise B 9
118 2004 NY Stapleton Crew B 5
119 2004 NY Lim Organization A 8
120 2004 NY Wang Organization A 8
121 2004 NJ Double 1I B 14
122 2004 GA Killing Every Spot L 13
123 2005 WA The Bandidos Biker Gang M (W&L) 22
124 2004 CA Vineland Boyz L 33
125 2004 NY MS-13 L 13
126 2004 NY Bloods B 14
127 2003 UT Soldiers of the Aryan Culture W (WSPG) 12
(SAC)
128 2003 NV Hells Angels W (OMG) 42
129 2003 AZ Hells Angels W (OMG) 16
130 2003 MA Stonehurst Gang B 13
131 2003 NV Rollin' 60s Crips B 20
132 2003 NY Murder Unit B 3
133 2003 CA Hells Angels W (OMG) 17
134 2003 NY Unnamed Russian Gang W (10) 8
135 2003 NY Boot Camp Gang B 26
136 2003 NY Woodbine Crew B 3
137 2003 TX Texas Syndicate L 19
138 2003 CA Pitch Dark Family B 9
139 2002 GA Brownside Locos L 51
140 2002 GA Almighty Latin King and L
Queen Nation (ALKON)
141 2002 GA Malditos-13 L -
142 2002 GA Pachuco-21 L -
143 2002 GA Riverside Locos L -
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144 2002 IL Carman Brothers Crew B 7
145 2002 CA Aryan Brotherhood W (WSPG) 40
146 2002 MA Mello Organization M 6
147 2002 NM Cisneros Organization L 9
148 2002 MA Esmond Street Crew B 5
149 2002 UT King Mafia Disciples B 10
150 2002 NJ Lex Mob B 27
151 2002 CA West Coast Crips B 4
152 2002 CA Nazi Low Riders (NLR) W (WSPG) 12
153 2001 VA Dragon Family A 3
154 2001 TX Mexican Mafia L 7
155 2001 NY Patio Crew B 2
156 2001 VA Fulton Hill Hustlers B 12
157 2001 WI Gangster Disciples B 13
158 2001 CA Aryan Brotherhood W (WSPG) 8
159 2001 NY Bloods B 7
160 2001 CA Nuestra Familia L 13
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